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APPROPRIATE ECONOMIC POLICIES AT DIFFERENT STAGES OF 
DEVELOPMENT 
 
Victor Polterovich, Vladimir Popov 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This paper summarizes theoretical arguments and provides empirical evidence to support the   
statement that rational economic policies depend qualitatively on two factors – technological 
and institutional level of development of a country. We concentrate on the impact of three 
policies to promote the catch up development – import tariffs, increase of government 
revenues/spending, and the speed of foreign exchange reserves accumulation (“exchange rate 
protectionism”). It is shown that the impact of these policies may be positive or negative 
dependening on a stage of development; in each case we find threshold levels or critical 
combinations of GDP per capita and/or an institutional quality indicator. 
 
A theoretical  model demonstrates how tariff  protection and accumulation of reserves can  
boost long term growth  in the presence of externalities. 
 
 
 
РАЦИОНАЛЬНАЯ ЭКОНОМИЧЕСКАЯ ПОЛИТИКА НА РАЗНЫХ СТАДИЯХ 
РАЗВИТИЯ 
 
Виктор Полтерович, Владимир Попов 
 
Аннотация 
 
  В статье суммируются теоретические аргументы и приводятся результаты 
эконометрических расчетов, показывающие как рациональная экономическая 
политика должна  меняться  с изменением технологического и институционального 
развития страны. Мы рассматриваем три инструмента политики стимулирования 
догоняющего развития: импортные тарифы,  увеличение доли государственных 
доходов/расходов в ВВП и скорость накопления государственных валютных резервов 
(«протекционизм валютного курса»). Показано, что одна и та же политика может 
ускорять или замедлять рост  в зависимости от стадии развития. В каждом случае мы  
получаем критические уровни, либо критические комбинации душевого ВВП и 
индикаторов качества институтов. 
 
Приведена модель, демонстрирующая, как благодаря экстерналиям тарифная защита  и 
накопление резервов могут ускорять экономический рост.  
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 APPROPRIATE POLICIES AT DIFFERENT STAGES OF DEVELOPMENT  
       
       Victor Polterovich, Vladimir Popov 
  
1.Introduction 
Rational economic policy has to depend on the level of economic and social development of a 
country. This statement seems to be quite trivial.  Up to the middle of еру 1990s, however, most of 
research devoted to institutional and policy reform implicitly assumed that a developing country 
has to move along a strict line connecting a current point and an ideal point in institutional space. 
In most cases the modern USA economy was set up as a model. Price liberalization, privatization, 
deregulation, elimination of tariff and non-tariff trade barriers were unconditionally recommended 
to all developing and transition economies. No distinctions were made between Latin America, 
Africa or East Europe. The discussion concentrated around the speed of these changes 
(Williamson). 
  
The outcome of these recipes has been disappointing. Per capita GDP for Latin America and 
Caribbean countries decreased by an average 0.8 percent per year in the 1980s, and grew by mere 
1.5 percent per year in the 1990s. In Middle East and North Africa economies, we observed the 
average fall of 1.0 percent per year in the 1980s and the average growth of 1.0 percent per year in 
the1990s.  For 28 countries of East Europe and former USSR, the total loss of GDP amounted to 
30% in the 1990s.   
 
It is now widely accepted that the most important causes of the recession were the weakness of the 
new market institutions and the low quality of governance and that the role of government was 
underestimated (World Bank, 1997;  Stiglitz, 1997;  Popov, 2000). A number of recent empirical 
studies have shown that the recommendations mentioned above could not be considered as 
universal recipes. Privatization does not necessary entail restructuring and increase in efficiency. 
Deregulation may cause financial crises. A thorough analysis of statistical data does not reveal any 
positive connection between openness and growth (Rodrik, 2003a). A possible conclusion is an 
agnostic view: only general principles like a necessity of market oriented incentives, economic 
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stability, and property right enforcement merit to be beliefs; each country is unique, therefore 
concrete policy recommendations can not be extracted from theoretical considerations or data 
analysis (Rodrik, 2003b).   
  
A different approach is based on the presumption that there exists a link between a set of 
technological, institutional and cultural indicators and rational economic policy. The absence of 
general universal recipes means that what may be good for developed countries is not necessarily 
good for developing ones. Elimination of tariff or subsidies to producers, liberalization of capital 
flows and deregulation of domestic financial markets, strengthening government control and 
promotion of competition may be good or bad for an economy depending on its stage of 
development. 
 
In the last two decades, developing countries experienced strong pressure of IMF, World bank, 
WTO and other international organization to accelerate the creation of modern institutions and to 
follow Western-type economic policies. The fairness of these demands was challenged by anti-
globalization literature. It questions also the rational for applying the Western pattern of tradeoffs 
between different development goals (wealth, education, life expectancy, equality, environmental 
standards, human rights, etc.) to less developed countries. Policies that prohibit child labor, for 
instance, may be an unaffordable luxury for developing countries, where the choice is not between 
putting a child to school or into a factory shop, but between allowing the child to work or to die 
from hunger. The marginal cost of adopting stricter regulations in such areas as environment and 
human rights (reproductive rights, work conditions and safety standards, children’s and prisoners’ 
rights) in developing countries in terms of deterioration of other developmental indicators (life 
expectancy, rate of growth) may be prohibitively high.  
 
The argument in both cases is that most Western countries 100 years ago did not have either 
laissez faire markets, or today’s strict standards of protection of environmental and human rights. 
Advocating the acceptance of these standards in less wealthy parts of the world, and even 
threatening developing countries with economic sanctions in case they refuse to accept such 
standards, the West, whatever the good intentions may be, de facto undermines the 
competitiveness of poorer countries and preserves their backwardness. There are even accusations 
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of double standard (when the West was industrializing, it was not maintaining these standards) and  
“kicking away the ladder” (after the West got rich through exploitation of colonies and child labor, 
it does everything to slow down the growth of “the other world”; Chang, 2002).  
 
Two recent papers by Acemoglu, Aghion, Zilibotti (2002a,b) offer a model to demonstrate the 
dependence of economic policies on the distance to the technological frontier. The authors assume 
that a change of a country technological level is equal to the weighted sum of technological change 
due to imitations and innovations. The speed of imitation is fixed whereas the speed of innovation 
is larger for more advanced economies. The experience of new managers is most important for 
imitations, whereas their talents are crucial for innovation. If the distance to the technological 
frontier is large, the economy would be better off giving managers long-term contracts that would 
lead to imitation and investment based growth. But once the economy approaches the 
technological frontier and innovation yields greater returns than imitation, the life-time 
employment system should be replaced by the competitive selection. It is argued also that the 
optimal size of firms is an increasing function of the distance to frontier. 
  
Overall, the necessity of different economic policies for developed and developing countries is 
recognized now by many specialists. Their general conclusion is that developing countries should 
not embark blindly on market friendly policies/reforms, even if the latter proved to be beneficial in 
more advanced countries. 
 
Empirical evidence are sporadic, however, and theoretical argumentation is not systematically 
described. This paper is aimed at summarizing theoretical arguments and empirical evidence to 
support the statement that rational economic policies have to depend qualitatively on technological 
and institutional indicators of a country. We study the impact of import tariffs, increase of 
government revenue, speed of foreign exchange reserves accumulation on the rate of economic 
growth. It is demonstrated that the impact may be positive or negative; in each case we find a 
threshold level of GDP per capita and a threshold institutional quality indicators. 
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It is shown as well that import tariff policy, foreign exchange reserves accumulation policy and the 
increase in the financial size of the government are to an extent substitutable, so that a GDP per 
capita threshold for one of these indicators  depends on another one. 
 
These results, the experience of successful countries and theoretical arguments imply that there 
exist different stages of economic development that require different sets of economic policies.  
  
   2.Trade protectionism as industrial policy  
Fast growing countries are usually more involved into international trade – have higher and faster 
growing trade/GDP ratios (fig.1). In addition, there is a correlation between the share of 
investment in GDP and the share of export in GDP – countries which export more, invest more as 
well (fig. 2). However, fast growing and more intensively trading nations are not always and were 
not always more open to trade (had low tariff and non-tariff barriers) than their less globalized 
competitors: among countries with rapid growth of export/GDP ratios there are quite a few that 
maintained high import duties (fig. 3).   
 
As table 1 suggests, import and export taxes are used mostly by poor countries (with low GDP per 
capita) and countries with authoritarian political regimes: the higher was the level of democracy in 
1972-75 and the greater was democratization in the 1970-90s, the lower were import duties1. Do 
these countries make a mistake, is there evidence that more free trade policies would boost 
international trade and economic growth in these more protectionist countries? 
 
The debates on whether free trade or protectionism are more conducive to growth are as old as 
economic research itself. For the XIX century, although detailed statistics does not exist, there 
are some powerful examples, suggesting that the growth-promoting nature of free trade is not 
obvious: China after the Opium Wars had to open its economy to international trade completely, 
but GDP per capita in 1949, when the communists took power, was at the same level as in 1850; 
100 years was lost for growth despite pervasive openness. Recent empirical studies (Rodriguez 
                                                          
1 Export duties were are generally much lower than import duties. They were used also mostly by poor 
countries, but with low level and low increase in government revenues, i.e. they were probably used mostly for 
fiscal purposes. On the contrary, the correlation between import duties and  the level of government revenues 
was non significant (table 1).  
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and Rodrik, 1999; O’Roerke and Williamson, 2002; O’Roerke and Sinnoit, 2002; see for a 
survey: Williamson, 2002) found that there is no conclusive evidence that free trade is always 
good for growth: whereas protectionist countries grew more rapidly before the WWI (see fig. 4), 
they exhibited lower than average growth after the WWII. Rose (2002) estimated the effect on 
international trade of multilateral trade agreements, such as the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), its predecessor the Generalized Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and the 
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) extended from rich countries to developing countries, 
using standard “gravity” model of bilateral merchandise trade. He found little evidence that 
countries joining or belonging to the GATT/WTO have different trade patterns than outsiders, 
whereas the GSP giving poor countries better access to markets in developed countries, had a 
very strong effect (an approximate doubling of trade). 
 
Table 1. Factors explaining the level of import and export duties – cross-country OLS 
regression results (T-statistics in brackets) 
Dependent variable/ 
Explanatory variables 
Import duties as a % of  
Import, average for 1975-99 
Export duties as a % of  
export, average for 1975-99
Number of observations N = 104 N = 89 N = 89 N = 65 
Log PPP GDP per capita in  
1975, $ 
-.8. 6*** 
(-3.70) 
-11.9*** 
(-7.69) 
-2.88*** 
 (-3.27) 
-2.3 
(-3.51) 
Level of democracy in 1972-75 
(lower values mean more 
democracy)   
9.8* 
 (1.64) 
   
Increase in democracy index in 
1970-2000 (positive values 
mean democratization) 
-1.26** 
(-2.59) 
   
Government revenues as a % of G
in 1975 
 0.22 
(033) 
-0.07* 
(-1.82) 
-0.06* 
(-1.90) 
Ratio of government revenues to 
GDP in 1999 as a % of 1975 
   -0.012 
(-1.42) 
Constant 36.2*** 
(3.95) 
49.0*** 
(10.84) 
12.8***  
(4.97) 
11.7*** 
(5.28) 
Adjusted R2 44 44 21 28 
*, **, *** - Significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. Robust standard errors.  
 
 
The absence of the conclusive evidence on whether free trade is good for growth (see Rodriguez 
and Rodrik, 1999, for a survey) may be associated with the fact that the impact of lower trade 
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barriers on growth depends upon the level of development and quality of institutions. We try to 
identify these two thresholds, using the PPP GDP per capita as a characteristic of the level of 
development and several institutional variables as a measure of the quality of institutions. The brief 
description of the indicators of the institutional development follows.    
 
We define the quality of (state) institutions as the ability of the government to enforce its 
own rules and regulations, no matter whether these regulations are established by democratic 
or authoritarian regime. Good measures of the quality of institutions would be investment 
risk index (The International Country Risk Guide – World Bank, 2001) and indices of 
government effectiveness, political stability, rule of law, control of corruption, and quality of 
regulations (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobatón, 1999), measures of unofficial economy 
(Friedman, Johnson, Kaufmann, and P. Zoido-Lobatón, 2000). These measures, however, are 
available only for recent years, whereas we are interested in the quality of institutions in the 
beginning (or at least in the middle) of the period of economic growth.  
 
The Freedom House computes indices of civil liberties available from early 1970s, but they 
are very correlated with political rights indices (and hence measure mostly 
political/democratic liberties), whereas we are mostly interested in non-political rights 
(security of life, contracts, property, etc.). POLITY database has the same shortcomings. The 
case in point is Hong Kong, where there was no democracy/political rights neither under the 
British rule, no after the hand over to China in 1997, but where contracts and property rights 
were and are strictly enforced and where there is more order than in most other countries. 
That is why we use mostly Corruption perception index (CPI) for 1980-85 – these estimates 
are available from Transparency International for over 50 countries and make a lot of sense 
for our analysis. For instance, they show that in 1980-85 the Soviet corruption was in 
between developed and developing countries, whereas today Russia is at the bottom of the 
list of developing countries. CPI is measured on a 0 to 10 points scale (the higher the index, 
the lower is corruption, so actually it is the index of cleanness, not of corruption). 
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We also construct our own measure of corruption using the CPI. First, we regress the actual 
CPI on PPP GDP per capita2 and take the residual; second, we subtract this residual from 10, 
so we have a residual positive corruption index (the higher the index, the greater the 
corruption): 
 
CORRres = 10 – [CPI – (2.3 + 0.00082*Ycap75)] = 12.3 – CPI + 0. 00082*Ycap75,       (1) 
where CORRres is residual positive corruption index, CPI – actual average corruption perception 
index in 1980-85 from Transparency International. 
 
Using this index of residual positive corruption, we try to test how tariffs affect growth.  The best 
equation is the following: 
 
GROWTH=CONST.+CONTR.VAR.+Tincr.(0.06–0.0004Ycap75us–0.004CORRpos–0.005T), (2) 
 
where the dependent variable,  
GROWTH, is the annual average growth rate of GDP per capita in 1975-99,  
the control variables are population growth rates during the period and net fuel imports (to control 
for “resource curse”),  
T – average import tariff as a % of import in 1975-99, 
 Tincr. – increase in the level of this tariff (average tariff in 1980-99 as a % of average tariff in 
1971-80),  
Ycap75us – PPP GDP per capita in 1975 as a % of the US level,  
CORR pos – positive residual corruption in 1975, calculated as explained earlier.  
R2=40%, N=39, all coefficients are significant at 5% level, except the last one (33%), but 
exclusion of the last variable (a multiple of T by Tincr.) does not ruin the regression and the 
coefficients do not change much.  
 
This equation allows to test the hypothesis that there is a threshold level of GDP per capita and 
corruption: at lower than threshold levels of GDP per capita and low levels of corruption the 
impact of the increase in tariff protection on economic growth is positive, whereas at higher than 
                                                          
2 The regression equation is  CPI = 2.3 + 0,00082*Ycap75, N=45, R2 =59%, T-statistics for Ycap75 coefficient 
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threshold levels the impact of protectionist policies is negative. The threshold levels are such that 
for poor countries (GDP per capita at below 50% of the US level), but with relatively low 
corruption (below 10, whereas CORRpos varies from 6 to 13) and low initial levels of tariff 
protection, growth can be stimulated by the increase in import tariffs. For wealthier and/or more 
corrupt countries the impact of tariffs on growth is negative3.  
 
Two recent papers (Acemoglu, Aghion, Zilibotti, 2002a, 2002b) suggested some theoretical 
explanations for these stylized facts, although not with respect to tariff protection, but with regard 
to promotion of vertical integration and imitation of technology versus indigenous R&D – the 
larger the distance to the frontier, the greater the returns from vertically integrated companies and 
from reliance on imported technology. In a similar way, it may be argued that the impact of trade 
protection on economic performance depends upon the distance to the technological frontier – the 
larger the productivity gap between the country in question and the most advanced (Western) 
economies, the more likely that protectionist policy, encouraging investment into “catch-up” 
pattern of development would be beneficial. Besides, greater corruption undermines the positive 
impact of tariffs on growth – this conclusion is very much in line with intuition.  
 
The debate, in fact, is even more general – it is about the impact of industrial policy in a 
developing economy, not only about trade protectionism, which is nothing more but just one tool 
of industrial policy. Whereas for developed countries industrial policy may be of little use, for 
countries that are catching up appropriate (export-oriented) industrial policy promises high returns. 
“In his famous essay, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective, Gerschenkron argued 
that relatively backward economies, such as Germany, France, Belgium and Russia during the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
is 9. 68.  
3 We tried to find a GDP per capita threshold for the 19th century using data from (Irwin, 2002), but failed. The 
best equation linking growth rates in 1870-1913 to GDP per capita and tariff rates (27 countries, two periods – 
1870-90 and 1890-1913 – 54 observations  overall) is:  
 
GROWTH = 0.24 + 0.04*Y – 0.0004*Y2 – 0.05*T + 0.001*T2 + 0.0006*Y*T, 
Where Y – GDP per capita in 1870 nor 1890 respectively, T – average tariff rates  
(R2adj. = 33%, all coefficients significant at 11% level or less). 
 
Introducing squared variables to capture non-linearity, we get better results than in (Irwin, 2002) – the R2 is 
twice as high, but the basic relationship between growth and tariffs is monotonously positive without a 
threshold: higher tariffs – faster growth. It may well be that the sample of 27 countries only is not that 
representative.   
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nineteenth century, could rapidly catch up to more advanced economies by introducing 
“appropriate” economic institutions to encourage investment and technology adoption. He 
emphasized the role of long-term relationships between firms and banks, of large firms and of state 
intervention. Underlying this view is the notion that relatively backward economies can grow 
rapidly by investing in, and adopting, already existing technologies, or by pursuing what we call an 
investment-based growth strategy. If this assessment is correct, the institutions that are appropriate 
to such nations should encourage investment and technology adoption, even if this comes at the 
expense of various market rigidities and a relatively less competitive environment” (Acemoglu, 
Aghion Zilibotti, 2002a). 
 
With respect to rapidly growing countries of East Asia this argument was made in the World Bank 
Development Report “East Asian Miracle” (WDR, 1993), but the issue is by no means settled and 
the controversies continue. So far there has been only 5 countries that managed to transform 
themselves in the second half of the XX century from developing into developed (Japan and 4 
Asian tigers – Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan); all these countries relied heavily on 
various industrial policy instruments, including protectionism.  
 
WTO rules prohibiting increases in protection of domestic markets, except for special 
circumstances, may thus actually be destructive for developing countries. Not to speak about most 
appalling cases, such as subsidies to agricultural producers in Western countries, blocking the 
access of developing countries to Western markets.  
 
    3.The size of the government  
Related to industrial policy, albeit a different issue, is the one about the size of the state 
(government revenues and expenditure as a % of GDP), which may be good or bad for economic 
growth. There is extensive literature on the issue (see: Gordon and Wang, 2004, for a survey). 
Unlike most other scholars, we look not at the level of the ratio of government revenues to GDP, 
but at the growth of this ratio (revenues are very much correlated with government expenditure, 
but we take revenues in order to avoid the influence of government budget deficits). On average, 
over the period of 1975-99, the ratio of central government revenues to GDP increased by some 
20% (from mean of 22.1% in 1975 for 70 countries to 25.8% in 1999 for 100 countries – see fig.5). 
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We look at the ratio of government revenues (rather than government expenditure) to GDP to 
exclude the impact of budget deficits: one can think that this indicator shows the ratio of 
government expenditure fully backed by revenues to GDP. Finally, we have to compare only 
revenues of central governments because the comparable data for consolidated government 
budgets are missing.  
 
We do not pretend to test the causation (whether the growth of the government causes economic 
growth or vice versa), it is necessary to use the panel data for that and there are limitations for time 
series. However, the fact is that faster growth was associated with the larger increases in the size of 
the government, even controlling for the level of development and for the size of the country (table 
2 and 3). 
 
The logical argument about causation would be the following. Government revenue as a % of GDP 
is at least partially a policy variable: whereas it may be difficult to increase the share of revenues 
in GDP, governments always retain an option of decreasing it via lowering the tax rates. But it 
does not appear that countries that were reducing or limiting the growth of government revenues 
were doing better than the others, in fact they were doing worse. There is an optimal rate of the 
increase in the ratio of government revenues/GDP ratio as the GDP per capita increases 
(determined by the need to provide more and more public goods), so countries that under-spend or 
overspend on the central government may have lower growth rates.  
 
Cuts in government spending and lower efficiency in enforcement of government 
regulations, as measured by the index from (Kaufmann, Daniel, Kraay, Aart, and Zoido-
Lobatón Pablo, 1999) or by the increase in the share of shadow economy negatively affect 
growth. As regressions presented in table 2 and 3 suggest, controlling for the level of 
development, investment climate and inflation, investment tend out to be higher in countries 
with high and growing level of government revenues. Similarly, controlling for the level of 
development, investment climate and population change, growth rates of GDP per capita are 
lower in countries with smaller and shrinking governments and larger shadow economy. 
Even when such control variables as effectiveness of the government, inflation, population 
growth rates and the size of the country (since bigger countries have smaller governments) 
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are introduced, the impact of the increase in the share of government revenues in GDP is 
positive and significant, whereas the impact of the level of the share of government revenues 
in GDP is also positive, though less statistically significant (see table 3).  
 
Table 2. Impact on investment and growth of government revenues in 1975-99 and the 
share of shadow economy in GDP in the 1990s – cross country OLS regression results  
Dependent variable Average investment/ 
GDP ratio in 1975-99 
Average growth rate of GDP per capita in 
1975-99 
Number of observations 56 51 62 62 47 47 
PPP GDP per capita in 1975, $ -.001*** -.001*** -.0002* -.0003**   
Log PPP GDP per capita in 
1975 
    -4.97*** -4.99***
2000 investment climate index, 
ICRG (ranges from 0 to 100%) 
.32*** .21***   .15*** .16*** 
Average population growth rate 
in 1975-99, % 
  -.93*** -1.08***   
Share of central gov. rev. in 
GDP in 1971-75, % 
.15** .14*  .05(Tst= 
1.62) 
  
Share of central gov. rev. in 
GDP in  1995-99 as a % of 
1971-75 
.011*** .05** .011* .014*   
Share of the shadow economy 
in GDP in the 1990s, %, 1st  
estimate 
    -.044***  
Share of the shadow economy 
in GDP in the 1990s, %, 2nd 
estimate 
     -.044***
Log of annual average inflation 
in 1975-99, % 
 -1.51**     
Transit. Economies dummy    -3.82*   
Constant  -.21 5.62 2.61** 1.88 9.31*** 8.49*** 
Adjusted R2 32 34 12 16 61 59 
*, **, *** - Significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.  
 
 
 
This is not to argue that bigger governments are always better. The point here is that the ability of 
the government to provide public services may be limited by two factors – the scarcity of financial 
resources and the low efficiency of the government apparatus, and as a result this ability may be 
weaker than it should be to maintain reasonable economic growth. 
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Table 3. Growth of GDP per capita – impact of government effectiveness and change in 
government revenues in 1975-99 – cross-country OLS regression results  
 
Dependent variable Average growth rate of GDP per capita in 1975-99 
Number of observations 59 58 59 57 
PPP GDP per capita in 1975 -.0003** -.0004*** -.0006*** -.0008*** 
Average population growth rate in 1975-99 -.87*** -.96***  -.50* 
Share of central gov. rev. in GDP in 1971-75, % .04 (Tst = 
=1.4) 
.06**  .03 (Tst= = 
1.3) 
Share of central gov. rev. in GDP in  1995-99 
as a % of 1971-75 
.015*** .017** .01** .013** 
Government effectiveness in 2001   1.95*** 1.80*** 
PPP GDP in 1999, bill. $  .0003(Tst
=1.3) 
 .0003** 
Annual average inflation in 1975-99, % -.029*** -.027*** -.021*** -.018*** 
Constant  1.86(Tst=  
1.2) 
1.55(Tst=
1.0) 
1.84*** 2.04 
(Tst=1.6) 
Adjusted R2 29 30 58 62 
*, **, *** - Significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
Note: It is known that the size of the government (budget revenues and expenditure as a % of 
GDP) depends on the level of development (GDP per capita) and the size of the country 
(GDP) – see Rodrik (1996a). Controlling for GDP and GDP per capita in the regression 
explaining growth rates, we de facto consider only policy-induced level of government 
revenues, i.e. only the level that is higher or lower than “objectively determined” by the size 
of a country and its level of development.  
 
Table 4 reports regressions to determine the threshold level of GDP per capita and the optimal 
increase in the ratio of government revenues to GDP over a prolonged period of time (1975-99). 
The best equation4 explaining growth is the following: 
 
GROWTH = CONST. + CONTR. VAR.+ 0.08* G∆ - 0.0003* G∆ 2 – 0.0003*G*Ycap75us  =  
= CONST. + CONTR. VAR. + G∆ *(0.08 - 0.0003* G∆  – 0.0003 * Ycap75us),  (3) 
where G∆ – the share of government revenues in GDP in 1999 as a % of 1975,  
Ycap75us – PPP GDP per capita in 1975 as a % of the US level.  
 
 
                                                          
4 This is the 6th equation. The last, 7th equation is for checking the robustness – we introduce the rule of law 
index instead of the investment climate index and get the improvement of the goodness of fit with a larger 
sample of counties.  
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Table 4. Factors explaining growth of GDP per capita in 1975-99 (level and growth of 
government revenues) – cross country OLS regression results  (T-statistics in brackets) 
Dependent variable Average growth rate of GDP per capita in 1975-99 
Number of observations 53 53 65 53 53 53 60 
2000 investment climate index, 
ICRG (ranges from 0 to 100%) 
0.13*** 
(5.69) 
0.10*** 
(4.06) 
 0.12*** 
(5.08) 
0.09*** 
(3.55 
0.09*** 
(3.69) 
 
Rule of law index (ranges from –
2.5 to +2.5; higher values – 
stronger rule of law) 
      1.88*** 
(6.97) 
Investment as a % of GDP, 
average in 1975-99 
 0.12*** 
(3.01) 
  0.12*** 
(3.12) 
0.12*** 
(3.27) 
 
Average population growth rate 
in 1975-99, % 
-0.79***
(-2.87) 
-0.81*** 
(-3.15) 
 -0.72***
(-2.68) 
-0.74*** 
(-2.97) 
-0.77***
(-3.15) 
-0.46** 
(-2.05) 
Share of central gov. rev. in 
GDP in  1995-99 as a % of 
1971-75 
0.02*** 
(2.62) 
0.01** 
(2.14) 
0.08*** 
(2.61)  
0.09*** 
(2.57) 
0.08*** 
(2.64) 
0.08** 
(2.56) 
0.11*** 
(3.15) 
Share of central gov. rev. in 
GDP in  1995-99 as a % of 
1971-75, squared 
  -.0002**
(-2.26) 
-.0003** 
(-2.08) 
-.0003** 
(-2.24) 
-.0003**
 (-2.11) 
-.0004** 
(-2.50) 
Interaction term = (share of 
central gov. rev. in GDP in  
1995-99 as a % of 1971-75) x 
(PPP GDP per capita in 1975 
as a % of the US level) 
-0.0004 
*** 
(-5.14) 
-0.0003 
*** 
(-4.17) 
 -0.0003 
*** 
(-5.00) 
--0.0003 
*** 
(-4.04) 
-0.0003 
*** 
(-4.40) 
-0.0005 
*** 
(-6.08) 
PPP GDP in 1975, bln.$      1.2 
*10-12  
(1.61) 
6.7*10-13  
** 
(2.24) 
Constant  -6.75***
(-3.79) 
-6.98*** 
(-4.24) 
-3.36* 
(-1.81) 
-9.71***
(-4.35) 
-9.91*** 
(-4.83) 
-9.83***
(-4.92) 
-3.60* 
(-1.89) 
Adjusted R2 47 59 9 50 58 60 67 
*, **, *** - Significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
 
Other regressions presented in table 4 prove the point: whether different control variables 
(investment climate, investment, population growth rates, size of GDP) are included or excluded, 
the result is that the growth of the share of government revenues in GDP is good for growth, 
especially for less developed countries, but until a certain level only.  
 
Differentiating (3), we get the expression for the increase in growth due to marginal increase in 
government revenues to GDP ratio:  
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dGR/dG = 0.08 – 0.0006 G∆  – 0.0003Ycap75us 
 
It implies that the optimal (maximizing growth) change in the share of government revenues in 
GDP in 1975-99 for very rich countries (Ycap75us = 100%) was about -27% ( G∆ =83%); for 
medium income countries (Ycap75us = 50%) the optimal increase was  8% ( G∆ =108%); for poor 
countries (Ycap75us = 10%) optimal increase was 28% ( G∆ = 128%).  
 
In addition to the threshold level of GDP per capita, there exists a  threshold level of 
corruption as well. The following equation identifies both:  
 
GROWTH = CONST. + CONTR. VAR. + G∆  (0.02 - 0.000037Ycap75us*CORRpos), (4) 
R2 = 53%, N=35, all coefficients significant at 6% level or less, the control variables are 
population growth rates and government effectiveness index in 2001.  
 
It implies that the increase in the ratio of government revenues to GDP is good for poor and 
relatively clean countries, for instance  for a country with GDP per capita of less than 50% of 
the US level and with residual corruption of no more than 10 (in reality CORRres varies from 
6 to 13). For the US (Ycap75us=100%, CORRres = 10.6) the increase in the ratio of 
government revenues to GDP by 10% over the period lead to the decrease in annual average 
growth by 0.2 p.p.  
 
4. Foreign exchange reserve accumulation 
Fast growing countries usually have undervalued exchange rate (ceteris paribus lower ratio of 
domestic to US prices), which is achieved due to rapid accumulation of foreign exchange reserves 
– FER (appendix table, fig. 6). As a result, there is a positive correlation between the accumulation 
of reserves, the share of investment in GDP and economic growth (appendix table, fig. 7). It was 
shown for developing countries that overvaluation of the exchange rate is detrimental for economic 
growth by including the variable that characterizes the undervaluation of the exchange rate into 
standard growth regressions (Dollar, 1992; Easterly, 1999). Rodrik (1986) developed a model 
demonstrating how disequilibrium exchange rate in the presence of foreign trade externalities 
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could lead to the acceleration of growth5. Rodrik (2003) believes that large real exchange rate 
devaluations have played a big role in some of the more recent growth accelerations, notably in 
Chile and Botswana, although not in East Asia.  
 
Empirical evidence seems to suggest that the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves (FER) 
contributes to economic growth of a developing economy by increasing both the investment/GDP 
ratio and capital productivity. The discussion and interpretation of these stylized facts is offered in 
(Polterovich, Popov, 2002). First, FER accumulation causes real exchange rate undervaluation that 
is expansionary in the short run and may have long term effects, if such devaluations are carried 
out periodically and unexpectedly. Second, real exchange rate undervaluation allows to take full 
advantages of export externality and triggers export-led growth. This is sometimes called the 
“exchange rate protectionism” and quantitatively is considerably more important than conventional 
trade barriers6.  Third, FER build up attracts foreign direct investment because it increases the 
credibility of the government of a recipient country and lowers the dollar price of real assets. This 
third mechanism can operate even with the exchange rate overvaluation, if benefits from FDI 
inflows exceed costs of not utilizing fully the export externality.  
 
It appears that this policy works primarily for developing countries (like with trade protectionism 
there is a threshold level of GDP per capita) and that trade protectionism and “exchange rate 
protectionism” are sometimes substitutes, but sometimes complementary, so that both policies at a 
certain stage of development can achieve growth promoting results. There are important 
differences between  import duties and devaluation of the exchange rate. As Larry Summers once 
observed: "A ten percent decline in the dollar exchange rate is equivalent to a ten percent tariff on 
all imported goods and a ten percent subsidy for all exported goods (The New Republic, 25 
January, 1988, p. 14). But the import duties and export subsidies raise the real exchange rate (level 
                                                          
5 In this early paper Rodrik (1986) assumes the import externality, which is used via the overvaluation of the 
exchange rate that stimulates imports of machinery and equipment. There is no doubt this import externality 
exists, especially at the early industrialization stages, but there are only limited opportunities to reap this 
externality through overvalued exchange rate because such an overvaluation would lead to the trade deficit and 
the depletion of reserves. Rather, the appropriate way to use this externality is to set different tariffs for final 
products (high) and intermediate products (low) or to subsidize imports of machinery directly. 
6 Real devaluation of 20-30% during the short period of time (1-2 years) is not that uncommon, whereas import 
duties as a % of import rarely change more than by several p.p. One of the most protectionist legislation ever –   
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of prices in the country as compared to the world), whereas real devaluation lowers the real 
exchange rate7. The issue is discussed in greater detail in the theoretical model (last section).  
 
We tried to determine the threshold level of GDP per capita for both policies – accumulation of 
reserves and trade protectionism. We use the indicator of the policy-induced changes in reserves 
(Polterovich, Popov, 2002), where the impact of the objective factors (GDP per capita and trade to 
GDP ratio) on the reserves to GDP ratio is netted out. First, we computed the regression linking the 
increase in the reserves/GDP ratio in 1975-99 to initial (1975) GDP per capita, average ratio of 
foreign trade to GDP over the period and the increase in the same ratio over the period 
( )/(24.0)/(1.0lg4.1138 YTYTYR ∆++−=∆ , R2=34%, N=82, all coefficients significant at 0.1% 
level). Then we considered the residual as the policy-induced change in reserves. The logic behind 
such an approach was to net out changes in reserve/GDP ratio caused by objective circumstances, 
such as the level of development and the level and dynamics of foreign trade. Afterwards we used 
the policy induced change in foreign exchange reserves as one of the explanatory variables in 
growth regressions together with import taxes and change in government revenues/GDP ratio. In 
this way we deal with the possible endogeneity  problem: policy-induced change in reserve to GDP 
ratio in 1975-99 could be regarded as a exogenous policy variable.  
 
The results are in table 5.  The first three equations imply that accumulation of reserves stimulates 
growth in relatively poor countries, but the impact of this policy is getting smaller and smaller as 
countries approach the threshold level. In the second and third equation that contain a number of 
control variables, the threshold GDP per capita is 66-75% of the US level: accumulation of 
reserves in relatively rich countries is detrimental to economic growth.   
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Smooth-Hawley tariff of 1930 in the US – raised duties an average of only 6 percent on the prices of imported 
products (Faux, 1988). 
7 The ratio of domestic prices for non-tradables (education and health care) to prices of tradables (clothing and 
footwear) depends significantly on the GDP per capita and somewhat less significantly (16% and 23% 
respectively) on the level import duties – the higher import duties, the higher are prices for non-tradables (N= 
56 in both cases), R2 is 18% and 14% respectively.  
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Table 5. Factors explaining the average growth rate of GDP per capita in 1975-99 
(trade protectionism and reserve accumulation)– cross country OLS regression results  
Dependent variable Average growth rate of GDP per capita in 1975-99 
Number of observations 40 40 40 74 34 
Rule of law index in 2001    1.0*** 
(3.94) 
 
Positive residual corruption (controlling for 
the GDP per capita) in 1980-85 
-0.27** 
(-1.99) 
-0.37***
(-3.23) 
-0.40*** 
(-3.43) 
  
PPP GDP per capita in 1975, % of the US 
level 
 -.034*** 
(3.52) 
-.039*** 
(-3.97) 
  
Net fuel imports, % of total imports, in 
1960-99 
0.018* 
(1.96) 
    
Size of the economy (PPP GDP in 1975, $)   1.1*10-12 
***(2.79) 
 9.6*10-13 
***(2.74)
Average population growth rate in 1975-
99, % 
 -1.12***
(-3.67) 
-1.14*** 
(-3.70) 
-0.57* 
(-1.93) 
-1.12*** 
(-3.62) 
Policy determined increase in the ratio of 
FER to GDP from 1975 to 1999, p.p. 
0.11** 
(2.05) 
0.09** 
(2.30) 
0.1** 
(2.43) 
0.07 
(1.56) 
0.12*** 
(3.00) 
Interaction term = (GDP per capita in 
1975) x (increase in the ratio of FER to 
GDP from 1975 to 1999, p.p.) 
-.00002*
(-1.73) 
-.0012**
(-2.04) 
-.0015** 
(-2.37) 
 -.002*** 
(-2.78) 
Share of central gov. rev. in GDP in  1995-
99 as a % of 1971-75 
    0.05*** 
(3.00) 
Interaction term = (share of central gov. 
rev. in GDP in  1995-99 as a % of 1971-
75) x (PPP GDP per capita in 1975 as a % 
of the US level) 
    -
.0003*** 
(-4.22) 
Interaction term = (share of central gov. 
rev. in GDP in  1995-99 as a % of 1971-
75) x (positive residual corruption in 1980-
85)  
    -.003*** 
(-2.94) 
Average import duties as a % of import in 
1975-99 
   0.06** 
(2.28) 
 
Interaction term = (GDP per capita in 
1975) x (average import duties as a % of 
import in 1975-99) 
   -.003***
(-4.70) 
 
Interaction term = (increase in the ratio of 
FER to GDP from 1975 to 1999, p.p.) x 
(average import duties as a % of import in 
1975-99) 
   -0.006* 
(-1.70) 
 
Constant  4.8*** 
(3.38) 
9.0*** 
(6.12) 
9.6*** 
(6.36) 
2.2*** 
(3.76) 
3.0** 
(2.10) 
Adjusted R2 29 49 52 43 57 
*, **, *** - Significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
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The interpretation of this result could be the following: developed countries have already achieved 
the optimal share of foreign trade in GDP, whereas in developing countries the share of foreign 
trade stays at sub-optimal level due to externalities from international trade (returns to the 
economy are greater than the returns to particular firms). One way to reach the optimal level of 
international trade and to reap the benefits of trade externalities is to accumulate foreign exchange 
reserves, which would lead to the underpricing of the exchange rate and greater exports and later – 
imports. There is evidence that countries with high reserve accumulation have lower real exchange 
rate, and that the latter is correlated with the increase in the share of external trade in GDP 
(Polterovich, Popov, 2002).  
 
We tried to find the threshold level of the quality of institutions (corruption variable), but it turned 
out that corruption level and change do not affect the impact of reserve accumulation on growth. 
This is consistent with intuition – whereas corruption should matter for the impact of government 
spending and tariffs (because these selective policies could be captured by lobbyists), it should not 
affect negatively the impact of reserve accumulation, because exchange rate protectionism is not a 
selective policy, it creates stimuli for all producers of tradables.  
 
Consider now the 4th equation in table 5: 
 
GROWTH= CONST.+CONTR.VAR.+ T(0.06–0.0027Ycap75us)+ R∆ pol (0.07-0.006T),    (5) 
The control variables are the rule of law index for 2001, the size of the economy in 1975, and the 
population growth rates in 1975-99. N=74, R2=44%, all coefficients are significant at less than 
10% level, except for coefficients of Rpol (11%) and the PPP GDP in 1975 (16%). 
 
The equation implies that tariff protection is good for relatively poor countries (with GDP per 
capita below 22% of the US level) and that reserve accumulation (exchange rate protectionism) are 
substitutes, so that accumulation of reserves is good for growth in countries with average tariff of 
less than 12%. Later, in subsequent section, where we consider the impact of all three types of 
policies, we cannot find this tariff–reserves substitution effect.  It may well be that the effect of 
tariffs on growth depends on what particular industries are being protected and whether tariff 
protection is accompanied by export subsidies (see theoretical model in the last section for details).  
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The 5th equation in table 5 is:  
GROWTH=CONST.+CONTR.VAR.+ G∆ (0.05–0.0003Ycap75us–0.003CORRpos)+ R∆ pol(0.12 
– 0.002Ycap75us),           (6) 
 
This equation implies that the growth of government revenues/GDP ratio is good for most 
countries, excluding the richest ones and the most corrupt ones (if Ycap75us is higher than 100%, 
whereas CORRpos >7, the impact of the increase of government revenues/spending on growth 
becomes negative). It also allows to determine the threshold level of GDP per capita for the impact 
on growth of reserve accumulation: for countries with GDP per capita higher than 60% of the US 
level, the accumulation of reserves has a positive impact on growth; for richer countries the impact 
is negative.  
 
Overall, so far it appears that the underpricing of the exchange rate via reserve accumulation is the 
most promising policy for developing countries: first, unlike tariffs that are good only for poorest 
countries, reserve accumulation works for middle income countries as well; second, “exchange 
rate protectionism” is more efficient policy to stimulate growth because decisions on import duties 
and government taxes/spending are affected by poor quality of institutions (corruption and low 
efficiency of implementation), whereas low exchange rate policy is indiscriminate and non-
selective by nature: it cannot be captured and “privatized” by particular interest groups, which 
makes it especially efficient growth promoting instrument in poor and middle income countries 
that generally suffer from corruption. 
 
In practical terms, there are no formal limits for the accumulation of reserves by developing 
countries, but “exchange rate protectionism” can result in “beggar-thy-neighbor policies” – 
obviously all countries cannot exercise these policies at the same time to achieve undervaluation of 
their exchange rates. The Plaza Accord of 1985 involved the coordinated efforts of major Western 
countries to appreciate their currencies against the dollar in order to reduce the US trade deficit; as 
a result, the Japanese currency appreciated from 239 yens to the dollar in 1985 to 128 yens in 
1988. Export/GDP ratio in Japan that increased from 10 to 15% in 1960-84, fell to 10% by 1986 
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and stayed at this level until today. Economic growth in Japan slowed down dramatically in the 
1990s, although there is still no persuasive evidence of the causal link between these two events.  
 
China did not devalue yuan versus the dollar after the 1997 Southeast Asian currency crises mostly 
on political reason  – it took an economic hit since its exports was competing with ASEAN exports 
in Western markets for the sake of providing assistance to its neighbors and promoting East Asian 
solidarity. Revaluation of the yuan versus East Asian currencies after the Asian crisis caused a 
deflation in China (prices decreased or virtually did not grow in 1998-2002) and a slowdown of 
economic growth (from 10% in 1996 to 7% in 1999). More recently, in 2003, the US pressed 
China to revalue, but without much success.  
 
The US-IMF policy to force countries to appreciate their exchange rates (via selling their reserves) 
is in fact depriving these countries of a powerful tool of growth promoting policy. It is possible 
that exchange rate protectionism of developing countries would provoke conventional 
protectionism in the West. According to IMF, “reserves in emerging economies in Asia are now at 
the point where some slowdown in the rate of accumulation is desirable from both domestic and 
multilateral perspective… An eventual narrowing of the US current account deficit from its present 
unsustainable level will likely require emerging economies in Asia to share in the adjustment, to 
prevent an undue burden of the adjustment on other economies… not least to keep protectionist 
pressures at bay” (IMF, 2003). 
 
5. Putting the pieces together: joint impact of three policies (trade protectionism, 
accumulation of reserve, increase in government revenues/GDP ratio) 
 
 
Examining the joint impact of three policies on growth, we get the following equation:  
 
GROWTH = CONST. + CONTR.VAR.  + G∆ *(0.034 – 0.00059*Ycap75us –0.0027*T) +  
+ T*(0.28– 0.010* R∆ pol ) + R∆ pol*(0.15 – 0.002*Ycap75us),     (10) 
where:  
T – import tariffs as a % of imports, average for 1975-99, 
G∆  - share of central gov. rev. in GDP in  1995-99 as a % of 1971-75, 
R∆ pol – policy-induced increase in the ratio of FER to GDP from 1975 to 1999, p.p., 
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Ycap75us – PPP GDP per capita in 1975 as a % of the US level.  
 
Among the control variables are population growth rates in 1975-99, rule of law index for 
2000 (to control for the quality of the institutions),  and PPP GDP in 1975 (to control for the 
size of the country – larger countries grow faster on average than the smaller ones, probably 
due to advantages of single market with one currency). All coefficients are significant at 5% 
level (most – at 1% level), N= 50, R2= 73%. 
 
We experimented with this equation substituting the rule of law index for the risk index and 
corruption perception index (see below) – the results do not change. We also tried to find the 
threshold level of GDP per capita for tariff protection policy by introducing the interaction 
term (Ycap75us*T), but it was not significant. The increase in tariffs over the 1975-99 period 
was significant in some specification, however: we got the negative coefficient for the 
multiple of the increase in tariffs over the period by the tariffs levels, i.e. T*(constant –  
Tincr), suggesting that the increase in tariffs may be excessive and affect growth negatively.  
 
Equation (10) suggests that the increase in government revenues/GDP ratio is good for growth 
only for countries with per capita of less than 58% of the US level and that the higher the import 
duties the lower this threshold level of per capita GDP (so that government spending and import 
duties are interchangeable). It also follows from the equation that import tariffs are good for 
growth in countries with low increase in government revenues/GDP ratios and low accumulation 
of reserves. Finally, reserve accumulation is good for growth in countries with GDP per capita 
below 75% of the US level and low import tariffs. 
 
Consider now a hypothetical country with no increase in government revenues/GDP ratio in 1975-
99 ( G∆ =100%), no increase in policy determined level reserve/GDP ratio over 1975-99 period 
( R∆ pol = 0), and zero import tariffs in 1980-99  (T = 0). To see the impact of various policies on 
growth, we differentiate the equation (10), and get a convenient expression for the marginal impact 
of three types of policies on growth rates: 
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dGROWTH=d G∆ *(0.034–0.00059*Ycap75us)+0.28*dT+d R∆ pol*(0.15–0.002*Ycap75us).  (11) 
 
Assuming that two policies out of three under examination are absent (either G∆ =100% and  
R∆ pol = 0, or  G∆ =100% and T = 0, or R∆ pol = 0 and T = 0), we can compute the marginal 
impact on growth of 10 % tariff, of reserve accumulation (+10 p.p. of GDP over the period) and of 
the increase in government revenues/GDP ratio by 10 p.p. over the period respectively. The results 
are  presented graphically at fig. 8.  
 
For very poor countries (less that 10% of the US PPP GDP per capita in 1975) with no tariffs, no 
accumulation of reserves in excess of objective needs, the increase in the ratio of government 
revenues to GDP by 10 p.p. would have resulted in a pretty modest increase in the average annual 
growth of GDP per capita of 0.2 p.p. a year. Accumulation of foreign exchange reserves – increase 
in reserves/GDP ratio by 10 p.p. from 1975 to 1999 could have increased growth by over 1 p.p. 
annually. The introduction of tariffs equivalent to 10% of imports was most promising: it could 
have boosted average annual growth by 2.8 p.p. a year. The positive impact of tariffs on growth 
was constant for poor and rich countries, whereas the impact of the increase in the share of 
government revenues in GDP was positive for countries with GDP per capita of less than 58% of 
the US level. The most lasting effect for catch up development was that of the accumulation of 
reserves, which was good for growth in countries with GDP per capita of less than 75% of the US 
level.  
 
Such was the magnitude of the growth effects in 1975-99 of three different policies for a 
hypothetical country – that was just starting to increase tariffs from zero level and to increase 
government revenues/GDP and reserves/GDP ratios from the level of 1975. But in reality, of 
course, countries were not starting from scratch and pursued various combination of policies in the 
period in question. The simple way to evaluate the potential of a particular policy in the presence 
of other two types of policies (that imposed constraints on the first policy, because they were 
interchangeable) and to see to what extent in each particular case three types of policies were 
growth promoting is to compute partial derivatives from the growth equation (10) on government 
revenues/GDP ratios, on tariffs and on reserves/GDP ratios respectively:  
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GROWTH = CONST. + CONTR.VAR.  + G∆ *(0.034 – 0.00059*Ycap75us –0.0027*T) +  
+ T*(0.28– 0.010* R∆ pol ) + R∆ pol*(0.15 – 0.002*Ycap75us),     (10) 
 
dGROWTH/d G∆   = 0.034 – 0.00059*Ycap75us – 0.0027T, 
dGROWTH /dT = 0.28 – 0.010* R∆ pol – 0.0027* G∆ , 
dGROWTH/d R∆ pol = 0.15 – 0.002*Ycap75us – 0.010*T     
 
These partial derivatives are presented graphically at fig. 9, assuming that G∆ (for computing  
dGROWTH/dT) and T (for computing dGROWTH/d G∆  and dGROWTH/d R∆ pol) were at the 
actual levels. The chart seems messy at a first glance, but in fact is very telling. Most developed 
countries had little to gain from reserve accumulation (square points on the chart) and increase of 
government revenues/GDP ratios (diamonds on the chart) even controlling for the existing degree 
of tariff protection: the partial derivatives of growth on G∆  and R∆ pol were close to zero. The 
marginal effect of tariff protection (T, triangles on the chart) after controlling for the increase in 
government revenues/GDP ratio was sometimes substantial, but the magnitude of the impact for 
most of the developed countries was much less pronounced than for developing countries.  
 
For developing countries the picture is much more diverse: it seems like for most rich countries  
the similar and uniform no-intervention policies were most promising, while for poor countries the 
impact of three types of growth promoting policies was substantial and dissimilar – for each 
country the combination of most beneficial policies was different. Most of developing countries 
had negative dGROWTH/d G∆  and dGROWTH/dT, but positive dGROWTH/d R∆ pol, suggesting 
they could have boosted annual average growth rates of GDP per capita in 1975-99 by several 
percentage points annually via decreasing import tariffs and government revenues/GDP ratios and 
increasing the pace of the accumulation of reserves. On the other hand, there was quite a number 
of countries that had to decrease the reserves (given their actual levels of tariff protection) and a 
few countries with too low tariffs (given their actual rates of increase in the ratios of government 
revenues to GDP).  
 
Table 6 presents the breakdown of countries in 3 income groups (PPP GDP per capita in 1975 in 
the range of 0-25%, 25-60% and 60-120% of the US level) that could have benefited from 
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particular combination of policies in 1975-99, given their GDP per capita, actual level of the 
increase in government revenues/GDP (for computing the impact of tariff protection) and actual 
level of tariff protection (for computing the impact of the increase in the government 
revenues/GDP ratio and the impact of reserve accumulation). In a sense, this is a typology of 
“good policy sets” for countries at various stages of development.  
 
The most typical “good policy” for rich countries was to decrease tariffs, cut reserves slow down 
the increase in government revenues. Among low and middle income countries more than half 
could have benefited from accumulation of reserves, and nearly a quarter – from high tariffs, faster  
reserve accumulation and more rapid increase in government revenues. For other developing 
countries the appropriate policy would have been cuts in size the government, decrease in reserves 
and tariff protection.  
 
Table 6. Policy potential of  countries with different GDP per capita   
Countries that would have benefited from  Number of countries with  
Different policy potential / 
PPP GDP per capita in 1975 
as a % of the US level 
increase/ 
decrease 
 in tariffs 
increase/ 
decrease 
 in reserves 
Increase/ 
Decrease in  
revenues/GDP ratio 
0 – 25% (25 countries) 4/20 12/12 5/19 
25 – 60% (12 countries) 4/8 7/5 3/9 
60 – 120% (13 countries) 3/10 1/12 0/13 
ALL COUNTRIES 11/38 20/29 8/41 
  
To put it differently, prescriptions for speeding up growth in rich and poor countries are different. 
Whereas for many poorest and middle income countries tariff protectionism, accumulation of 
reserves (exchange rate protectionism) and expansion of the fiscal capacity of the government  
were conducive to growth,  appropriate policy for the majority of rich countries was to decrease 
tariffs, cut reserves and the growth of government revenues.  
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6. Complicating the problem: joint impact of three policies (trade protectionism,     
accumulation of reserves, increase in government revenues) depending on the level of 
development and quality of institutions 
 
Running regressions with all our previous policy variables, but also including positive 
residual corruption index in 1980-85 and PPP GDP per capita in 1975 (CORRpos and 
Ycap75us), we get the following best equation with all coefficients significant at 10% level 
or less: 
 
GROWTH = CONST. + CONTR.VAR. + G∆ *(0.074–0.00027*Ycap75us–0.005*CORres) +  
T*(0.00061*CPIincr – 0.077) + R∆ pol*(0.090 – 0.0014*Ycap75us),         (12) 
 
where CPIincr – corruption perception index in 1999-2003 as a % of 1980-85 level, characterizing 
the increase in the “cleanness” of  a country, 
CORRres – residual positive corruption computed as explained earlier.  
 
All coefficients in this equation are significant at 1% level (except for R∆ pol*Ycap75us, which is 
significant at 5% level), N= 34, R2 = 67%.  The control variables are population growth rates and 
size of the country (PPP GDP in 1975). We experimented with this equation trying to find for 
tariffs and reserves increase variables the same threshold levels of GDP per capita and corruption, 
as the one found for the increases in government revenues, but the results were worse. We also 
tried to include the interaction terms for policy variables (reserve accumulation, increase in 
government revenues, tariffs) – mostly  these interaction terms had predictable signs and were 
close to being significant, but at the expense of the decrease in significance of other variables.  
 
The equation suggests that there is a certain critical level of positive residual corruption index and  
PPP GDP per capita in 1975: before this level is reached increase in government revenues/GDP 
ratio is good for growth, afterwards these increases are only detrimental to growth. The economic 
interpretation of these threshold levels is rather transparent: increases in the fiscal size of the 
government are good for poor and “clean” (low corruption) countries,  but bad for rich and “dirty”  
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countries, whereas for “dirty”-poor and “clean”-rich countries the final impact depends on what 
effect predominates.  
 
The impact of reserve accumulation on growth does not depend on corruption (we tried to 
introduce “GDP per capita–corruption” interaction term, but it turned out to be insignificant). Such 
a result is also in line with economic intuition: corruption hurts growth because it lowers the 
efficiency of government spending and protectionism (corrupted government makes wrong 
spending decisions and protects wrong industries), whereas exchange rate protectionism (reserve 
accumulation) is not a selective policy and hence cannot be “privatized”.  
 
Tariff protection was good for growth only in countries that managed to decrease corruption 
considerably in the 1980s – 90s, whereas neither the level of corruption in 1980-85, nor the initial 
level of GDP per capita had an impact on the efficiency of tariff protection. To put it differently, 
import tariffs were bad for growth, unless countries that introduced them made a considerable 
progress (over 26% increase in the “cleanness” – actual CPI index – in 1980-85–2002-03.  
 
The interpretation could be that the impact of tariffs on growth is more immediate than the impact 
of government revenues-spending: whereas the increase in the fiscal size of the government affects 
growth positively only if the certain level of “cleanness” is reached, tariffs have a positive impact 
on growth in all countries, even the corrupt ones, provided they make a considerable progress in 
the reduction of corruption during the period in question. Allegedly tariffs were changed quite 
often during the 25 years (1975-99), so for import duties to have a positive impact on growth, each 
new  round of tariff change had to be better that the previous one, which was possible only in 
countries that made considerable progress in fighting corruption, i.e. where tariff structure changed 
not under the pressure of lobbying groups, but to stimulate industries with largest potential 
externalities for the growth of national economy. 
 
Consider now a hypothetical country with no increase in government revenues/GDP ratio in 1975-
99 ( G∆ =100%), no increase in policy determined level reserve/GDP ratio over 1975-99 period 
( R∆ pol = 0), and zero import tariffs in 1980-99  (T = 0). To see the impact of various policies on 
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growth, we differentiate the equation (12) to get a convenient expression for the marginal impact 
of three types of policies on growth rates: 
 
dGROWTH = d G∆ (0.074 – 0.00027*Ycap75us– 0.005*CORRres) + dT(0.00061*CPIincr – 
0.077) + d R∆ pol(0.090 – 0.0014*Ycap75us)      (13) 
 
This equation is presented graphically at fig. 10. It is similar to the fig. 8 in the previous section – 
after a certain critical level of GDP per capita the impact of three types of policies considered here 
on economic growth becomes negative. The impact of reserve accumulation on growth is similar – 
it is described by the same linear  function of GDP per capita (because the impact of reserve 
accumulation does not depend on corruption), but has more modest quantitative characteristics (a 
10 p.p. increase in reserves/GDP ratio over the 1975-99 period could yield a 0.7 p.p. increase in 
annual average growth rate for countries with GDP per capita of 10% of the US level; it diminishes 
for richer countries and disappears completely for countries with GDP per capita of 65% of the US 
level). But the impact of tariff protectionism and increase in government revenues is different.  
 
First, these impacts are not represented by straight lines, like in the chart in the previous section, 
because now these impacts are not linear functions of GDP per capita, but also of corruption levels 
(for government revenues/GDP ratio) and corruption change (tariff protectionism). Second, and 
more importantly, the impact of the increase in government revenues now is positive for virtually 
all countries (although for developed countries it is negligible), whereas the impact of tariff 
protectionism is negative for all developed countries, but positive and substantial for some 
developing countries (namely those that managed to decrease corruption noticeably).   
 
Fig.  10 suggests that three major stages of development depending on the level of income and the 
quality of institutions can be tentatively identified. At the first stage (when GDP per capita is 
below 25% of the US level) all countries – with good and bad institutions – can benefit from the 
accumulation of reserves and increase in the fiscal capacity of the state. Countries that manage to  
improve institutions (cut corruption) at this low stage of development can also benefit from tariff 
protection. The positive effect of the increase in government revenues to GDP ratio is greater, 
when corruption is lower, but the actual relationship between corruption and GDP per capita is 
 29
such, that the negative effect of corruption (poor institutions) pales in comparison with the positive 
impact from increasing government revenues to GDP ratio. Besides, the accumulation of reserves 
yields growth dividends irrespective of the corruption levels.  
 
At the second stage (when GDP per capita is within 25% to 65% of the US level) all countries can 
benefit from then accumulation of reserves and the increase of the fiscal capacity of the state, but 
the impact of tariff protection for most countries is negative.  That is to say, middle income 
countries should continue to build up reserves/GDP and government revenues/GDP ratios, but 
should generally phase out import tariffs because their impact becomes very small and even 
negative (remaining positive only for the least corrupted countries). Finally, at the third stage 
(when GDP per capita is above 65% of the US level) countries should slow down the increase in  
government revenues/GDP ratio because its impact on growth becomes very small, and should 
phase out growth promotion policies in the form of tariff protection and accumulation of reserves 
because their impact becomes outright negative.   
 
Given the actual relationship between the level of development (GDP per capita) and the quality of 
institutions (corruption), it turns out that out of three policies under consideration, the policy of 
tariff protectionism is most sensitive to the quality of institutions. It is unconditionally good only 
for the “cleanest” developing countries, whereas other policies are good for corrupted countries as 
well. The art of the policymakers in developing countries is to switch from one set of policies to 
another as the technological level and the quality of institutions improve.  
 
Countries with smallest effects of best policies – with less than 0.2 p.p. of growth impact of each 
policy (i.e. with smaller deviation of all three points from the zero horizontal line) – that could not 
have gained much from altering the rates of tariff protection, reserve accumulation and  
government revenues/GDP ratio, are mostly developed countries, such as Finland, Japan, Italy, 
Netherlands, Norway, and countries that became developed during the period in question, such as 
Greece, Spain and Israel. Generally these countries had low rate of tariff protection and reserve 
accumulation and low rate of increase of government revenues/GDP ratio. Among countries that 
could have benefited most from using the three growth promotion policies in question (combined 
effect of three policies increasing the potential annual average growth rate by 1 p.p. and more) are 
 30
Bangladesh, Bolivia, Egypt, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines. Some of 
these countries (Egypt, India, Indonesia) managed to pursue good policies and to increase GDP per 
capita  by over 3% a year in 1975-99, but others (Bolivia, Nigeria, Philippines) failed to utilize 
fully their potential advantages via tariff protection, accumulation of reserves, increase in 
government revenues/GDP ratio. 
  
It is noteworthy that in the current regression (with corruption), the impact of the increase in 
government revenues to GDP ratio is positive for virtually all countries, whereas in the previous 
regression (without corruption) the impact was positive only for countries with GDP per capita of 
less than 58% of the US level. The economic interpretation is the following: if we account for 
corruption (institutional quality) in the regression equation and the fact that the “cleanness” 
increases with the growth of GDP per capita), it turns out the positive impact of the expansion of 
the government becomes stronger. Most countries were able to gain from the increase in 
government revenues/spending (unlike in the equation with only GDP per capita and no 
corruption) because the growth of “cleanness” with the increase in GDP per capita was pretty fast. 
Had it been slower, many medium income and rich countries would have found themselves in the 
situation, when the positive effect of corruption-free environment is not enough to counterweigh 
the negative effect of “richness”.   
 
To put it differently, the process of economic development is characterized by the technological 
advancement  (increase in GDP per capita)  and improvement in quality of institutions (increase in 
corruption perception index). As GDP per capita increases, the policy of boosting government 
revenues/expenditure yields less and less dividends (because externalities from enlarging the state 
are being depleted); however, as corruption falls (CPI increases), boosting government 
revenues/expenditure yields more dividends (because government efficiency increases). What the 
chart above tells, is that the combined effect of these two processes is such that for most countries 
increases in government revenues/spending have positive, although diminishing, effect on 
growth8.  
 
                                                          
8 The same line of reasoning with the same conclusions could be presented for the policy of tariff protectionism. We 
do not do it here to save space.  
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Consider now the impact of three policies on particular countries – given their actual GDP per 
capita, corruption level and change in this level. Partial derivatives of growth on government 
revenues, tariffs, and reserve accumulation from equation (12) are now equal to: 
 
dGROWTH/d G∆   = 0.074 – 0.0027*Ycap75us – 0.005*CORres, 
dGROWTH /dT = 0.00061*CPIincr – 0.077, 
dGROWTH/d R∆ pol = 0.090 – 0.0014*Ycap75us.  
 
Fig.  11 shows the 3 policy impacts for 43 countries depending on their actual GDP per capita and 
changes in the level of corruption. This time there are only 43 points on the chart mostly due to 
constraint with data on corruption in 1980-85. There are obviously four groups of countries, that 
are shown in table 7:  
 
1. Poor, but  successfully fighting corruption – left upper quadrant (that could have benefited 
from all three types of growth promotion policies – expansion of the state, accumulation of 
reserves, tariff protectionism:  G+, R+, T+);  
2. Poor and not being able to fight corruption (left lower quadrant: G+, T-, R+); 
3. Developed countries – rich and making small progress in fighting corruption (lower middle 
quadrant: G+, T-, R-); 
4. Developed countries – very rich and making small progress in fighting corruption (lower right 
quadrant with only two countries – US and Switzerland: G-, T-, R-). 
 
Table 7. Policy potential of  countries with different income and different corruption   
Groups of countries  PPP GDP per capita  
as a  % of the US level  
CPI in 2002-03 as a  
% of  1980-85 level 
Appropriate  
policies 
Poor-clean (10 countries)  Less than 65% Over 126%  G+, R+, T+ 
Poor – corrupted  ( 20 countries) Less than 65% Less than 126% G+, R+, T-  
Rich – clean  (12 countries) 65-100% Less than 126% G+, R-, T- 
Very rich – clean ( 2 countries) Over 100% Less than 126% G-, R-, T-  
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The appropriate question to ask at this point is how various countries used their potential 
advantages in growth promotion, i.e. to what extent actual policies were in line or out of line with  
the best possible policies. For instance, Indonesia as a poor country (5% of the US GDP per capita 
in 1975) and as a country that reduced corruption dramatically in the 1980s-90s (CPI increased 
from 0.2 to 1.9) could have benefited in 1975-99 from the 10% import tariff by gaining 5 p.p. of 
annual average growth rate of GDP per capita; from increasing the reserve/GDP ratio over the 
period by 10 p.p. – another 1 p.p. of growth; from increasing the ratio of government revenues to 
GDP by 10 p.p. – another 0.1 p.p. of growth. The question is: did Indonesia used these policy 
potential, did she exercise tariff protection,  accumulate the reserves, increased the fiscal size of 
the government?  
 
Next three charts (figs. 12-14) compare partial derivatives of growth on each of three type of 
policies (dGR/dT-potential, dGR/dG-potential, dGR/dR-potential – diamond points on the charts) 
with actual contribution of these policies to growth calculated from equation (12) by introducing 
actual values of policy variables G∆ , T, R∆ pol (so we get dGR/dT-actual, dGR/dG-actual, 
dGR/dR-actual – square points at the charts).  
 
The results for Indonesia is that in reality she gained 2 p.p. of growth via relatively low tariff 
protection of 4% (in 1975-99 the  average unweighted tariff for all countries was 13%); another 1 
p.p. of growth via rapid accumulation of reserves –  the ratio of policy determined reserves to GDP 
increased over the period by 11 p.p. (for all countries the average was 0 p.p.); and another 1 p.p. 
via increasing the ratio of government revenues to GDP in 1975-99 by modest 15 p.p.(on average 
for all countries – 19 p.p.). The actual growth rates of GDP per capita in Indonesia in 1975-99 
were nearly 4% a year (the small difference is due to the negative impact of population growth 
rates and positive impact of the size of the country, plus error term).  So, in fact Indonesian record 
is pretty impressive – all three types of policies operated in a right direction, even though 
Indonesia could have been even more successful with higher tariff protection and faster growth of 
the fiscal capacity of the state.  
 
From the three charts below it is easy to identify the typical policy mistakes for countries at 
different stages of development. Rich countries had nothing to gain and little to loose from 
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increasing tariff protection: because in reality their tariff protection was low, they did not loose 
much in terms of economic growth. All rich countries increased the government revenues/GDP 
ratio, but most of them had little to gain from such policy in terms of economic growth, so in 
reality they did not get much. For three rich countries (Italy, Switzerland, US) the impact of the 
increase in the government size was negative, so by increasing the ratio of government revenues to 
GDP (by 64, 56 and 13% respectively) these three countries actually slowed down economic 
growth. Finally, whereas for all rich countries the impact of reserve accumulation was negative, 
part of them decreased reserves (and gained in terms of growth – the biggest winner was 
Switzerland), while  another part increased reserves and slowed down growth (but not that much).   
 
For developing countries gains and losses from good/bad policies were more sizable. Some of 
them (with rapidly decreasing corruption) had a lot to gain from import tariffs and actually did 
gain (Indonesia, Egypt). Others (less successful in fighting corruption), on the contrary, had to 
loose from import tariffs and actually lost (Cameroon maintained 22% import tariff and lost over 1 
p.p. of annual average growth).  For all developing countries the impact on growth of the increase 
in government revenues to GDP ratio was positive, most of developing countries in reality 
increased this ratio and some of them got substantial growth gains (Ireland, Jordan, Kenya, 
Malaysia – up to 3 to 5 p.p. of annual average growth). Other countries, however, gained very 
little, i.e. failed to use their potential advantages to the full extent. Finally, for all developing 
countries  accumulation of reserves was a promising way to increase long term growth. Some, like  
Chile and Indonesia, did exactly that, but others, like Jordan and Ireland decreased reserves and 
slowed down their potential growth.  
 
These kind of calculations, of course, should not be taken at face value. The magnitude of the 
effects, calculated from simple linear regressions, is subject to change depending on the period and 
sample of countries. What we try to demonstrate here, is a general principle – developing countries 
have much to gain from growth promoting industrial policies – rapid accumulation of reserves, 
increase in government revenues/GDP ratio, and (those developing countries making rapid 
progress in fighting corruption) tariff protection. Many countries did exactly that and enjoyed high 
growth. But other countries pursued wrong policies and their growth record is much less  
impressive.   
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7. Accumulation of foreign exchange reserves and tariff policies:  
a theoretical consideration  
 
7.1. Introduction 
 It is quite standard to consider import substitution and export oriented policies as two 
incompatible alternatives. Outward orientation only is considered as “a necessary condition 
for rapid economic growth” (Krueger (1995)). However, some students of the history of the 
economic policies challenge this view. They point out that the most successful economies 
implemented both kinds of policies the same time. Hayami writes: “At least until the 1960s 
in Japan and until the 1980s in Korea and Taiwan, export-promotion policies were 
superimposed on the import-substitution policies rather than replacing them” (Hayami (1995, 
p.21)). With respect to Japan, a similar observation is made by Nam (1995, p. 168).  In many 
countries, trade liberalization reforms were accompanied by the domestic currency 
devaluation to damp down consequences of the liberalization shock (Edwards (1995)). This 
means that policy makers consider tariff and real exchange rate policies as substitutes.  
 
Our statistical data support this observation. They show that tariff policy often coexists with 
an active FER accumulation.  
 
 A question arises why this is a case. To see the problem, consider an economy where capital 
goods are imported. One may expect that the domestic capital production gains from tariffs 
due to capital price increase. However, export sector may suffer if an imported good is used 
for the export production. If real exchange rate increases due to tariff introduction then the 
tariff policy and the FER accumulation policy may hamper each other.    
 
 In this section we demonstrate, however, that, due to presence of externalities, both policies 
may change real exchange rate in the same direction and accelerate growth. This explains not 
only real experience but also our empirical finding: in the regressions (see  previous section) 
the speed of FER accumulation and the tariff levels  have the same signs of their impact on 
economic growth. 
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To fulfill this task we use a modification of a model suggested in Polterovich, Popov (2003). 
Below this model is described in detail, and a number of results that were got in the earlier 
paper are adduced. Propositions 5,6,8 as well as Sections 7.5 and 7.6 are new. Section 6 
shows that the influences of both instruments depend qualitatively on the structure of 
externalities. We suppose that the structure is changing in the process of economic 
development, and this is a plausible reason why economic policy has to be changed as well. 
At an early industrialization stage, domestic production of consumption creates the strongest 
external impact on the whole economy. A tariff policy has to use this externality. At this 
stage, tariffs increase real exchange rate, and selling of foreign exchange reserves affects the 
economy in the same direction. At the next stage of industrialization the capital production 
externality dominates. In this case, tariffs decrease the real exchange rate, and the tariff 
policy is compatible with FER accumulation. When, in the process of economic 
development, the export externality turns out to be the strongest one, tariffs may be 
abandoned, but the FER accumulation continues to serve for the acceleration of economic 
growth. 
 
In Section 7.5 we discuss a policy of the budget surplus accumulation (“stabilization fund”) 
and compare it with the accumulation of FER. 
7.2. A model 
    Why do countries accumulate foreign exchange reserves (FER)? It is a surprise that only a 
few researches are devoted to this question, and that a related theory does not seem to be well 
developed. One may argue that FER are necessary to pay debt, to support a chosen exchange 
rate regime, to smooth foreign exchange operation, and to prevent an attack against domestic 
currency. Another possible explanation refers to the portfolio argument: FER are a part of a 
country portfolio investment that earns world market interest rate. Our statistical analysis 
seems to reveal that these explanations are incomplete since the speed of FER accumulation 
is a policy variable that may be used to accelerate economic growth.  
 
To some extent, this point of view is close to an idea developed in Rodrik (1986). Rodrik 
suggested  a two- period model demonstrating how overvalued exchange rate could lead to a 
welfare improvement. He assumed learning-by-doing externality that influences domestic 
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production and show how the government may correct non-optimal market equilibrium. It is 
reached by an increase in government spending in the first period followed by a decrease in the 
second period to keep the two-period budget balance. The first shift in the government spending is 
financed by a first period fall in central bank reserves. Rodrik shows that this policy results in a 
total welfare increase through overvaluation of the real exchange rate in the first period and 
undervaluation in the second. Due to externality, the overvaluation gives an incentive to increase 
the efficiency of production.  
 
Rodrik’s model explains why a number of countries kept their real exchange rate overvalued at a 
very early stage of industrialization. However, at the next stage of development many fast growing 
economies preferred undervaluation to develop their export trade. It was shown above that this 
tendency dominates in our statistical data. In a recent paper Rodrik makes a point that a large real 
exchange rate devaluation has played a big role in the success of some economies, notably in Chile 
and Botswana (Rodrik, 2003).  
 In this section we suggest a  combination of a Sidrauski-type model and  an AK-type model 
of endogenous economic growth to study FER accumulation policies. It will be shown that, 
under reasonable conditions, FER accumulation may influence real exchange rate. Two 
hypotheses on mechanisms of this influence are considered. The first one assumes that the 
accumulation policy forces a country to follow an imbalanced regime keeping positive 
current account at a steady state.  
 
  At the first glance, there is no any sense to choose this regime since it results in pure losses. 
Why do not spend the reserves to increase consumption? We show, however, that the FER 
accumulation brings real exchange rate down.  Therefore, this policy facilitates export 
development and helps to defend domestic producers. If the export sector dominates in the 
knowledge accumulation, then, in accordance to the logic of AK-models, the FER 
accumulation accelerates growth. Moreover, under some more restrictive conditions, it may 
also increase discounted utility value even if the accumulated reserves do not earn any 
interest and can not be used in the future.  The essence of this effect is, of course, strong 
positive export externality.  
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 There are several objections against this hypothesis. One can think that reserve accumulation 
leads to inflation. This is not necessarily the case, however, if the rate of reserve 
accumulation does not exceed the rate of economic growth. Moreover, small inflation is not 
necessarily harmful, particularly for a developing economy.9 In what follows we disregard 
its influence assuming money superneutrality.  
 
 The imbalanced regime is associated with direct losses of resources10. Clearly, waste of 
resources is not a first best solution. If the government is strong enough it can tax consumers 
and subsidize exporters to extract the potential gain from the externality. However, 
subsidizing activity may be costly since it entails rent seeking. The costs are rather large for 
developing country where inclination to rent seeking is particularly strong.  
 
 Therefore reserves accumulation may be considered as a second best policy. However, if a 
government pursues a direct export promoting policy then the stimulating role of the FER 
accumulation turns out to be questionable.  
 
Another objection might stress the fact that import may have strong externality as well. In 
this case exchange rate undervaluation would not be reasonable. Some studies seem to show 
that export oriented policy is growth promoting. This may be interpreted as evidence that 
export externalities is stronger in the most developing countries than import ones. It is quite 
plausible however that the undervaluation policy is not efficient for import dependent 
countries.  
 
If domestic production substantially influences knowledge accumulation then the mechanism 
described above does not work. For this case FER accumulation can play a different role: it 
serves as a signal for foreign investors that the economy is in a good state.   
 
                                                          
9 This is a conclusion of a number of empirical works ( Lucas ( ), Bruno and Esterly (1995)). It is also a 
conclusion of the authors who considers the optimal taxation problem including inflation tax (Felps (1993), 
Braun (1994), Movshovich (1998)). 
10 The losses may be not so large if one takes into account that the reserves earn world market interest rate and 
may be used in the future. 
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In accordance to our second hypothesis, the speed of foreign investment is proportional to the 
speed of the FER accumulation. We assume also that the foreigners use domestic 
intermediates and earn world market interest rate that is smaller than domestic one. Under 
these conditions, FER accumulation results in pure capital inflow and brings real exchange 
rate up. This accelerates growth if domestic production externality is strong enough so that 
export sector has no knowledge accumulation advantage.     
 
The first hypothesis seems to be more plausible for earlier stages of fast development, and 
the second one fits better the later stages when a country is better integrated into the world 
market.  Note that for the third stage, when an economy is open, and domestic capital market 
is well developed, FER loose their role as an instrument of the economic growth acceleration.     
 
The model has some specific features that seem to be reasonable to postulate for a 
developing economy. The economy is small and is open for good flows. Concerning capital 
flows, we consider two versions of the model. In the first one foreign capital is not permitted 
at all. In the second version, foreigners may purchase assets through domestic intermediates. 
The intermediates pay them world market interest rate that is less than domestic one. These 
are foreigners who take the decisions on the investment volumes dependently on the speed of 
reserve accumulation. Indebtedness issues are ignored, and, in both versions, the domestic 
forces form the domestic interest rate. Under such conditions the learning-by-doing capital 
externality can influence economic growth as it does in Romer-type models (Romer(1996)).  
 
We assume also that export sale requires much greater capital expenditure than import 
purchase. This asymmetry seems to be plausible for a developing country where producers 
and traders have so much to learn about how to sell the domestic product. Thus export trade 
sector is introduced. This sector uses capital to convert a quantity of “nontradable” 
consumption good into the same quantity of the good marketed abroad.11 There are two 
interpretations of the trade sector activity. First, it may be considered as building marketing 
                                                          
11 Probably one can use a more standard model with composition of tradable and non-tradable goods (see , for 
example, Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996 )). The model should be modified properly to allow for endogenous 
growth. This approach does not seem to be simpler. Our model contains three sectors instead of two and one 
consumption good instead of two in the standard models with nontradables.  
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infrastructure: creating brands, making connections, and building capacities for selling goods 
abroad. Under this interpretation, one could count the consumption good as tradable one; the 
model reflects the fact that domestic and world prices of tradables are very different for many 
developing countries. Second, the activity may be considered as re-shaping of nontradables 
into tradables. Additional quantities require increasing increments of capital so that one could 
talk about a spectrum of goods with different degrees of tradability.  
 
The import trade is costless, so that the price of the imported good coincides with the world 
price.   
 
 The model includes also a representative consumer and two production sectors (Fig. 15). 
The first sector produces a consumption good, and the second one produces an investment 
good that can be also imported.  Its dollar price is taken for 1. 
     
The representative consumer maximizes overall utility function  
=Φ mах ∫∞ −+o t dtemvcu ρ))()((                                     (1) 
subject to the budget constraint 
 
pTbrrpcrapmdtpdmdtda +−+Π+−=++ )(// 1π ,                                  (2) 
 
where )()( mvcu +  is an additive momentary utility function, c  is consumption, m is real 
money holding,  0>ρ  is a constant rate of time preference, a is the quantity of real assets,  
Π  is the production  profit, p  is a price of the consumption good, π is inflation rate, b is a 
volume of assets held by foreigners, T is a money transfer, 1, rr  are, relatively,  domestic  
and world market interest rates. We  assume that foreign investor needs in resident 
intermediaries who appropriate the difference brr )( 1− .  This assumption reflects the fact 
that operations at a domestic financial market are more costly for foreigners than for 
residents.  
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It is postulated also that foreign investors spend abroad their interest payments )/(1 ξBr . All 
prices and real money are calculated in dollars. Real money and money transfers are 
measured in units of consumption.  Appendix 1 explains in detail how equality (2) is derived 
from a nominal budget constraint. 
 
Note that the choice of p  is equivalent to the choice of real exchange rate. For simplicity and 
following a tradition, we take labor force in each sector as a constant12, and assume that the 
“consumption part” of the momentary utility function is given by 
)1/()( 1 θθ −= −ccu ,                                        (3) 
 
where θ >0, θ  ≠ 1. As usual, the No-Ponzi-Game –Condition is supposed to be valid. 
 
The profit Π  is a sum of three terms 
Π = Π 1 +Π 2 +Π 3 ,                          (4) 
 
where Π i - is the profit of the Sector i. For simplicity we assume that all sectors have Cobb-
Douglas production functions that differs only by productivity multipliers, 
 
),( KkFAY iii = ,  αα −= 1),( KkKkF . (5) 
 
Here ik  is capital accumulated in the sector i, and K  is the knowledge accumulated in 
the process of learning by doing. It is assumed that 
 
ii kK βΣ=  .    (6) 
The profit of Producer i  is derived from maximization of the profit     
)),((max iiii rkKkFb −=Π , (7) 
where 332211 )(,, ApqbpAbAb −=== , q is a fixed price of the exported good.  
The following balance conditions are supposed to be valid. 
                                                          
12 The model may be developed to include labor allocation among sectors. It does not change our conclusions.  
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1
/ YdtdkI i
i
−=Σ= .            (8) 
c = Y2 -  Y3 .                        (9) 
    
RrdtdRbrdtdbqYI 113 // +−−+= .                                  (10) 
 
 Here R are accumulated reserves. The quantities b , dtdb / , and ,R  dtdR /  are supposed to 
be chosen by foreigners and the Central Bank, respectively.  
 
Asset market has to be balanced as well: 
  kba =+ = i
i
kΣ=
3
1
,                 (11) 
where k  denotes total capital in the economy.   Let 0k  be total initial capital. The following 
initial condition is postulated.            
 )0(0 kk = .                          (12) 
   It seems to be more natural to suppose that initial capital is fixed for each sector. In this 
setting, however, the study of the model would be much more complicated. 
 
 An equilibrium trajectory is defined as a set of functions, πλ ,,,,,,,,,,, mrpIKkkYac ii , that 
meets maximization and balance requirements (1)-(11) as well as initial condition (12).  
 
 It follows from the equilibrium conditions above and the budget constraint (2) that the 
money inflow in real terms is determined by the equation 
pTRrdtdRpmdtpdm +−=+ 1// π .                 (13) 
 
Since the momentary utility is additive, the first order conditions for the real part of our 
economy and, therefore, the real trajectory itself are independent on the monetary variables, 
m and π 13. This fact drastically simplifies our analysis.   
 
                                                          
13 This is well known property of superneutrality. It looks not very restrictive for the long term analysis. 
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Recall that, in the described setting, the price of consumption p  represents real exchange 
rate.  
 
The described three-sector model inherits a very useful property of a standard one sector AK 
model: it has no transitional dynamics.   
 To show this, suppose that the price of consumption p is constant over time.  Then 
maximum principle for the consumer problem (1)- (3) leads to a well known expression for 
the rate of economic growth, λ , 
 
ρθλ −= r .                      (14) 
 
It is convenient to introduce the notations 
 
ασσσσ −=== 1/1,, 2211 ApdAd .  (15) 
 σσ 33 )( Apqd −=  if ,qp ≤  03 =d  if qp > .  (15a) 
 
ii dphh βΣ== )(     1)()( −Σ== idpDD .                 (16) 
 
 
The following equalities are straightforward consequences of the relations (6), (16), and  first 
order conditions.  
 
kpDphK )()(=  ,                    (17) 
 
αα −== 1)( hprr ,                     (18) 
 
1−= Khdk ii  ,                        (19) 
 
DkhdAY iii
αα −= 1  .                    (20) 
 43
 
If p is constant then rate of return, r , is constant as well. In view of (14), the economy 
develops with a constant rate of growth. From the balance equality (8) one gets 
1YkI −= λ .                                                 (21) 
 
Using (10) one has an equation 
1Yk −λ = RrdtdRbrdtdbqY 113 // +−−+ .        (22) 
 
 
Assume that Rb,  grow with the rate λ . Since tekk λ0= , one has from (20) and (22): 
0
1
110 DkhdAk
ααλ −− = 0133 DkhdqA αα − + ))(( 100 rRb −− λ .        (23) 
 
This is an equation with respect to p . We assume that it has an appropriate solution, and will 
demonstrate that under some conditions, this is really the case.14  If p is a root of  (23), then 
all real variables are defined by formulas  (14)-(21), (9).  Rate of return, r , and rate of 
growth,λ , are constants, initial values of capital variables, K , ik , and outputs, iY , are 
calculated from (17), (19), and (20). Initial values of import, I , and consumption, c , are 
defined by (21) and (9). All the quantities grow with the same rate, λ . 
    Assume now that the monetary part of our instant utility function is )1/()( 1 θν θ −= −Nmm  
where N  is a positive constant. Then due to an optimality condition temm λ)0(= , and  
θθ π −− =+ )0()()0( Nmrc  . It is easy to check  that if )0(R is small enough then money 
transfer T (0) 0≥  may be chosen by such a way that teTT λ)0(=  and inflation rate, π , is 
equal to zero. Indeed, since m  and R  grow with equilibrium rate of growth, λ , one has 
from (13) 
)0()0()0()0()0( 1 pTRrRpmmp +−=+ λπλ .                  
  Thus if )0()0()0( 1RrRmp −≥ λλ , and )0(T  are chosen to meet equality  
)0()0()0()0( 1 pTRrRmp +−= λλ ,                 (13a) 
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then inflation is not arisen since sterilization serves to finance growth. Experience of many 
fast growing economies including Russia in 1999-2004 seems to support this conclusion. 15 
  We say that the economy follows a FER accumulation or imbalanced trajectory if 
0/ ≠dtdR . In this case trade balance IqY −3  may be positive or negative. If IqY =3 , the 
trajectory is called a balanced one.  
 The integral (1) exists iff the inequality  
                                        r<λ   (24) 
holds, or equivalently,  
                                r)1( θρ −> . (25) 
In what follows we compare balanced and imbalanced trajectories by  the value 
=Φ  ∫∞ −o t dtecu ρ)(                                      
along the trajectory considered. 
   Denote by 0c  an initial consumption that is defined by  (9).   Then the integral utility (24) 
is equal to 
))(1/(10 λθθ −−=Φ − rc                                        (26) 
 
for both FER accumulation and balanced trajectories. It is simple to check that 
03322
1
320 ][ kdAdADhYYc
ααα −=−= −  .  (27) 
 
Obviously, 0c  has to be positive, and, in view of our assumptions, import, I , has to be 
positive as well. Thus a solution, p , of the equation (23) defines an equilibrium trajectory if 
and only if it meets (25) and the following additional requirement 
αα
3322 dAdA ≥ .   (28) 
It is equivalent to the inequality 
pq <ζ ,                    (29) 
 where  += 1/1 ζ  α/132 )/( AA .   
                                                                                                                                                                                    
14 We postulate that the investment good is imported and the consumption good is exported. This can not be the 
case under arbitrary parameters of the model. 
15 It is probably valid for non-separable  utility functions as well. In this case, however, the rule of money 
supply has to be more sophisticated. 
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  Let introduce a concept of an autarkic trajectory. It is an equilibrium trajectory of the 
economic system where foreign trade does not exist. Formally, one has to substitute zero for 
3Y , I, b, R in the formulas above to have an autarkic trajectory. An equilibrium trajectory 
may be autarkic if   the term of trade, q , is not favorable enough so that foreign trade does 
not occur. 
 
 It follows from the above consideration that reserve accumulation may influence real 
exchange rate and, therefore, long run growth. Below, we consider two hypotheses on the 
influence mechanism. The consideration uses the fact that, if real exchange rate, r , increases 
then the rate of growth, λ , may go up or down dependently on the knowledge accumulation 
coefficients iβ . Indeed, from (14) one has  
                    ][)(' 333222
αα ββσ dAdAph −=  .   (30) 
Therefore the following statement is a straightforward consequence of   (16), (18), and (29). 
 
Proposition 1. The function )( ph  as well as )( pr  and )( pλ reach their minima at  
*ζqp = ,  where  */1 ζ = 1+ ααββ /132/1132 )/()/( AA+− .   (31) 
If 02 =β  then qqp =≤ *ζ , therefore rate of growth and rate of return both are decreasing 
functions of the real exchange rate. If 32 ββ ≥  then *ζζ qqp ≥> , hence )( pr  and 
)( pλ increase with respect to p in the feasible aria. 
        Since ρθλ −= r = ρα α −−1h , the basic equation (23) may be written as     
 
DdqAh
αθαα 331 [ −− - ∆+= ρθ α ]11 DdA  ,       (32) 
   where ∆= θλ 10100 ))(( −−− krRb .   An equilibrium trajectory is balanced if ∆= 0. A 
balanced trajectory is autarkic if 03 =d . Denote by )( pΨ  the left-hand side of (32).  
The function )( pD is decreasing since 
)()( 3322
2 αασ dAdADpD −−=′ (33) 
and in view of (28). 
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7. 3. Positive trade balance hypothesis 
Let foreign investments be absent. For simplicity, we assume 01 =r . Then 
∆= dtdRk /10 θ−− = θλ 100 −− kR . For a balanced trajectory ∆=0 and trade balance is zero. At a 
FER accumulation trajectory, positive trade balance IqY −3  are accumulated by the Central 
Bank and never used.     The model generates an imbalanced trajectory if a real exchange 
rate, p , meets the inequality   
13 YkqY −> λ .               
Usually a continuum of imbalanced trajectories exists. It was shown above that the real 
exchange rate is directly connected with the speed of FER accumulation dtdR / = IqY −3 .  
In framework of our model, FER grow with the rate λ , and the speed dtdR / is defined by 
initial value 0R . 
   Assume also that 02 =β  so that the production of the consumption good, Sector 2, does 
not contribute to the exchange rate. Then for an autarkic trajectory, one has σβ 11)( Aph = , 
and rate of growth does not depend on p . An autarkic real exchange rate, ap , is defined by 
the equation  
−− αβ α [111 A  ρθ σσσσ =+ − ])( 1211 ApAA  ,       (34) 
(see(32)) .The  following proposition  immediately follows from (34) and (25).             
 
Proposition 2.  Let 02 =β . An autarkic trajectory exists (under some q small enough)  if 
and only if the following inequalities are valid: 
01
1
1 >−> − Aαβρααθ .   (35) 
Indeed, under these conditions  the left hand side of (34), )( pΨ , increases with respect to 
p and ρ<Ψ )0( , ρ>∞Ψ )( .  
    Obviously, to prevent foreign trade the price q should meet the inequality ρ≤Ψ )(q . 
 Assume now that q  is a little bit larger than an autarkic price, ap , and consider equilibrium 
trajectories in a vicinity of the autarkic one. 
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    If 02 =β , then )( ph decreases with respect to p , and therefore λ,r  are decreasing 
functions of p  (see ((18),(14)). Thus, one gets the following important conclusion. 
 
Proposition 3. Let ap  be an autarkic price, and the influence of consumption good 
sector, 2β , on the knowledge stock, K , be small enough. There exists 
_
q such that for each 
q from the interval ap  < q <
_
q  a small FER accumulation increases rate of economic growth. 
This is reached by a small real exchange rate undervaluation.  
 
To prove the proposition, consider )( pΨ , the left hand side of the basic equation (32), under 
2β =0 and apq = . In view of  (15a), (30), and (33), the derivative )(' apΨ  is strictly 
positive. Let 2β  be small enough. If 
_
q  is close enough to ap , then a balance equilibrium 
exists for each q  from an interval ap  < q <
_
q , and 0)(' >Ψ qp  for equilibrium price qp , 
)( qpΨ = ρ . 
   Let ap  < q <
_
q , and consider an equation (32), )( pΨ = ∆+ρ , where ∆  is  small. Since 
)( pΨ  is increasing, the solution, )(∆p , is an increasing function of ∆ . FER accumulation 
means that 0<∆ . Hence, FER accumulation decreases )(∆p in comparison to the balanced 
trajectory, and, in view of Proposition 1, increases rate of growth. 
    An increase of the growth rate may be accompanied by a decrease of initial consumption, 
0c , so that the effect of undervaluation on the overall utility, Φ , is not clear a priory.  The 
following proposition points out some conditions that guarantee a positive affect of the 
undervaluation policy. 
 
Proposition 4. Let ap  be an autarkic price, and the following inequalities hold: 
 2/1>α ,                                                    (36) 
 )/( 212
σσσσσα ApAAp aa +< ,                     (37) 
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where )1/(1 ασ −= . If 2β  is small, and ap  < q <
_
q  then a small undervaluation brings 
initial consumption up as well as overall utility, Φ . 
 
Proof. Taking into account that )1()( θρλθ −−=− rr , one has from (26) 
.)/(])([)( 2000 λλθθ −′+−′=Φ′ − rrcrccp  
Thus the sign of Φ′  coincides with the sign of the function  
.)(')( 00 rcrcpF ′+−= λ  
In view of (30) and (33), one has from (27) 
+−−+−−= −− ]][[][' 332233322223322120 αααααααα ββσ dAdAdAdADhdAdAhDc
][ 123
2
3
12
2
2
2
1 −−− ++ αααασ dAdADh  .                                      (38) 
 
We take .10 =k  Assume now .0, 3 == dpp a  Since 2/1>α , one has            
                                           ),(' 2
12
2
12
20 DddhADc −= −− ασ αα  
where ., 21
1
22
σσσσσ ApADpAd aa +== − Therefore )(' 21221220 DddhADc −= −− ασ αα <0 in 
view of (37). 
This proves Proposition 4. 
 
Note that the condition (36), (37) seem to be very restrictive. Moreover, the condition (36) is 
necessary for validity of the statement of Proposition 4. One may assume that the difference 
pq −  has to be big enough to guarantee welfare improvement due to FER accumulation.  
  To formulate an existence theorem for a balance trajectory, let us introduce the following 
assumptions. 
)()1max( 1 ph ααθρ −−> ,                   (39) 
αρ α )[(1 qh −< - )](1 qDA σθ ,                                   (40) 
)()()1( 13 ζζζα σασσσ qDAqDAq +−< .              (41) 
The condition (39) means that 0)()( >− ppr λ  for all p. The inequality (40) is equivalent to 
0)( >qI . Both conditions look as restrictive ones. In fact, however, they are implied by  the 
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architecture of the AK- model and our assumption that capital is imported. The AK-model 
also requires 0>c  which implies ζqp > . For existence such an equilibrium, one needs in 
an additional technical restrictions of the model parameters. Condition (41) is an appropriate 
restriction. One may check that (41) is  fulfilled if )./( 323
1 AAA +<−αα  The last condition is 
much stronger than (41), however.  Note also that inequality (39) implies (35). 
 
Proposition 5. If conditions (39)-(41) hold then a balance equilibrium trajectory exists, 
and qpq << *ζ . 
 
Proof. Let us prove that the right-hand side of equation (32), )( pΨ , satisfies inequalities 
)( ζqΨ << ρ )(qΨ .(42) 
In view of (39) one has  
)()( 11 phph αα θαρα −− +< for all p . 
Therefore 
ρζ <Ψ )(q + −−− )()()[( 331 ζζαζθ αα qDqdqAqh ρζα <)](11 qDdA ,                                                  
where the second inequality follows from (41). 
  Conditions (40) implies 
)(qΨ = −− αα )[(1 qh ρθ α >)](11 qDdA . 
Hence (42) is valid, and Proposition 5 follows.   
 
Remark. It is useful to note that we proved an important statement on )( pΨ : it is increasing 
in a vicinity of an equilibrium. 
  Denote 00 Rb −=δ . The inequality 0>δ  means capital inflow into the economy due to 
foreign investments. If 0<δ  then the capital flows out of the system due to reserves 
accumulation. 
   Let *p  denote an equilibrium value of the consumption good. In our model, *p  is equal 
to real exchange rate. It has to satisfy the following constraints 
                       qpq ≤< *ζ .                                                
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Proposition 6.  Let (39)-(41) be valid, 02 =β , 03 >β , and 00 Rb −=δ  is small 
enough by its absolute value. Then an equilibrium trajectory exists, and qpq << *ζ .    If the 
balance equilibrium is unique, then for small δ  
a) rate of economic growth increases with respect to 0R  and decreases with respect to 0b ; 
b) real exchange rate  *p  decreases with respect to 0R  and increases with respect to 0b . 
    It was assumed that 0/ RdtdR λ= . Hence, Proposition 6 implies that small increase of FER 
accumulation accelerate economic growth through real exchange rate depreciation. 
       The statement that foreign investments hamper economic growth seems to be 
paradoxical.   
However, this phenomenon is totally similar to the accumulation reserve paradox. Foreign 
capital inflow causes depreciation of domestic currency and, therefore, create an obstacle to 
development of  the export trade sector. In view of our assumption on the structure of 
externalities ( 02 =β , 03 >β , 01 >β 16) , this  sector turns out to be vehicle of economic 
growth, so that the negative influence of foreign investments surpasses their positive 
contribution.   
    These conclusions illustrate an important general idea: a policy may be  good or bad for 
growth dependently on the structure of externalities. We suppose that the structure changes in 
the process of economic development, and these changes dictate a necessity to alter 
economic policy as well.    
 
Proof of Proposition 6.        
Since (42) is valid, one has 
)( ζqΨ <<∆− ρδζ ),(q ),()( δqq ∆−Ψ ,   (43) 
where θλδδ 01 ))((),( krpp −=∆=∆ , and δ  is small enough. This means that there exists a 
root, )(** δpp = , of equation (32), and qpq << )(* δζ .  Let the root be unique under 
0=δ . Then, for a small δ , the  function  =Ψ ),(1 δp ρδ −∆−Ψ ),()( pp  is increasing with 
respect to p in a neighborhood of its zero, and decreasing with respect to δ .  Therefore 
)(* δp is an increasing function of δ , it increases with respect to 0b  and decreases with 
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respect to 0R . Now, the statement a) of Proposition 6 follows from the fact that 
11 ))(()( −− −= θραλ α php  is a decreasing function of p . 
 
Note that in a multiple equilibrium case the statements of Proposition 6 are valid for a 
minimal root of (32) if this root is locally unique under 0=δ . 
 
In our model accumulated reserves are considered as completely useless. Under this 
condition, the detected possibility of a gain is a paradoxical result. Allowing to use the 
reserves in the distant future would make advantages of the reserve accumulation policy 
much more evident. Net gains of FER accumulation could then be demonstrated under much 
less restrictive conditions.  
 
The undervaluation policy may be beneficial even if the conditions formulated above are not 
fulfilled. Our numerical calculations reveal that there is a significant set of parameters under 
which small undervaluation raises overall utility. Fig. 16-18 demonstrate an example. 
 
7. 4.  Negative trade balance hypothesis 
Above we consider the initial stage of building an export trade sector when export externality 
is comparatively strong.  Assume now that 2β ≥ 3β , and that ∆= θλ 10100 ))(( −−− krRb >0 
since foreign investment are effectively attracted due to FER accumulation. Thus the trade 
balance turns out to be positive. 
  In view of  the Proposition 1, the function h and the growth rate,λ , are increasing with 
respect to the real exchange rate. Consider again the basic equation (32)  
 
DdqAh
αθαα 331 [ −− - ∆+= ρθ α ]11 DdA . 
It’s left hand side, )( pΨ , is an increasing functions in the feasible area.  
A balanced solution exists and is unique if the following sufficient conditions are fulfilled 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
16 This follows from (40). 
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><< αψρζψ ),()( qq 13 )1(( −− σσσ ςAq + )()1 qDA ζσ  
 
The last inequality ensures r)1( θρ −>  (or, equivalently, )r>λ . 
Indeed, for a balanced trajectory the equation (32) entails 
ρ−r = DdqAh αθα 331 (− + DdA αθ 11 ) θr<  
if  DdqA
α
33 + DdA
α
11 α< . The left hand side is decreasing and has to be taken at p = qξ . 
 
Proposition 7. Assume 1232 , ββββ ≥≥ . Then a small FER accumulation increases rate of 
economic growth as well as initial consumption and, therefore, overall utility. This is reached 
by a small real exchange rate overvaluation. 
 
Proof. Using relation (38) and the theorem condition, one gets 
12
2
2
2
12
332220 ])[('
−−− +−−≥ ααααα ασσβ dADhdAdADhDhc  
If Dhσβ ≥2 then 0'0 >c .  Let Dhσβ <2 , then 
][' 122
2
2
2
20
−− +−≥ hdDhdADhc ασσβαα . 
The sign of the right hand side coincides with the sign of the following expression 
iii d
d
d
d
Σ−Σ
−+ 222 )1(β
αβα . 
Since 312 ,βββ ≥ , the following inequalities are valid 
0)1()1( 22222 >Σ
−−+≥Σ−Σ
−+
iiii d
dd
d
d
d
d ααβ
αβα  
Thus, 0'0 >c . Since )( pΨ  is increasing, an increase in the right hand side of (32) brings the 
real exchange rate up and accelerates growth. 
 
7.5. State Budget Surplus Accumulation 
Accumulation of State Budget Surplus (BSA) is another instrument to devaluate real 
exchange rate and accelerate economic growth. This instrument is used much more rarely 
than FER, however. Contemporary Russia gives an interesting example:  in 2002, Russian 
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government established Stabilization Fund that was growing and reached about 10% of the 
yearly state budget revenue.  
 
The influence of BSA is partly similar to that of FER. To the similarity consider a 
modification of the model above. However, instead of FER, we assume that the government 
accumulates revenue of profit taxation.  This budget surplus is invested abroad into dollar 
assets. 
 
Assume also that the interest income earned comes back to the budget to be added to the 
consumer’s income. Then the consumer budget constraint (2) and foreign trade balance 
condition (10) have to be modified 
pTSrpcrapmdtpdmdtda ++Π−+−=++ 1)1(// τπ ,                                  (43) 
SrqYI 13 +Π−= τ ,                                                                                 (44) 
whereτ - profit tax rate, S - accumulated stabilization fund, Π=τdtdS / . All other 
equilibrium requirements (1), (3)-(9), (11), (12) do not changed. The basic equation (32) also 
keeps its form  
DdqAh
αθαα 331 [ −− - 111 ] ∆+= ρθ α DdA ,       (45) 
   where 1∆ = 1101101 )()( −−− −Π−=Π− θλλτθτ krkSr .  If rate of growth, λ , is large enough so 
that 1r>λ , then 01 <∆ . Therefore, if τ is small an analogue of Proposition 6 is valid, and 
BSA accumulation accelerates growth. 
 
We assumed that the source of BSA is non– distortionary profit taxation.  In practice , 
however, one may turn down BSA to decrease distortionary taxes. This is a shortcoming of 
BSA in comparison with FER accumulation. At other hand, BSA does not create inflationary 
pressure as FER accumulation does. FER accumulation is less sensitive to rent seeking. 
However, taxation is much more flexible instrument. More efforts are needed to compare 
these two instruments.   
BSA and FER accumulation both are costly since they mean that a part of resources is 
underutilized. Other possibilities are connected with industrial policy.  
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7.6 Tariffs and the real exchange rate 
 It was mentioned above that tariff policy sometimes coexists with active FER accumulation. 
This seems to be a puzzle. One has to expect that FER accumulation stimulates export trade 
whereas tariffs hamper it if an import good is used for the export production. In this section 
we show, however, that both policies may move real exchange rate in the same direction to 
accelerate economic growth if one takes into account learning by doing externalities. 
 Consider an economy depicted on Fig.15, and assume that import tariff is introduced. 
Assume also that the producer of investment goods does not use domestic capital ( 1kI >  in a 
balanced equilibrium) and is released from import duties17. 
 
This new setting is equivalent to the following modification of our model. Consider 
production  problems (7) where parameters  ib are modified: 
 sApqbAspbsAb /)(,)/(, 332211 −=== , where s  is a domestic price of the capital good, 
s -1 is a tariff rate. Then (see (15a), (15)) 
ασσσσσ −=== 1/1,)/(, 2211 AspdAsd ,  σσ 33 )//( Aspsqd −=  if ,qp ≤  03 =d  if qp > .   
 
All other formulas that define equilibrium remain valid including basic equation (32). Let 
FER accumulation is absent so that ∆=0. Denote a ratio of domestic prices of exportable and 
importable goods by spz /= . Since world market prices suppose to be constant this ratio 
plays the role of the real exchange rate.  Thus 
σσσσ
2211 , AzdAsd == ,  σσ 33 )/( Azsqd −=  if ,qp ≤  03 =d  if qp > .   (46) 
Then the basic equation (32) may be written as 
)],()[,(),( 1 szQszhsz θαα −=Ψ − ρ=] ,       (47) 
where                                     
+= DdqAszQ α33),( DdA α11 ,                        (48) 
ii dszh βΣ=),( ,                                             (49) 
1)(),( −Σ== idszDD .                                   (50) 
                                                          
17 Without this somewhat artificial assumption, the introduction of tariff would not make any sense in our  
simplify model where the only input of the capital production is the capital itself.  
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  Let *p  be an equilibrium price in the economy without tariffs when s =1.  
 
The following proposition solves, at least partially, the puzzle of the simultaneous increase of 
tariffs and the FER accumulation. 
 
Proposition 8. Let (39)-(41) be valid. Assume that the equilibrium is unique, and 1kI > . 
Then the following statements are valid. 
a) If  1β  >> 3β >> 2β  ( 1β  is much larger than 3β  which is much larger than 2β ), and 
2/1<α , 13 AqA >  then a small tariff and/or a small FER accumulation both decrease 
real exchange rate and accelerate growth.  
b) If 3β >> 2β , 2/1<α , and *pq −  is small enough then a small tariff and/or a small 
FER accumulation both decrease real exchange rate and accelerate growth. 
c) If 1β  > 0 , 2β ≥ 3β , and 2/1>α , *pq −  is small enough then a small tariff increases 
real exchange rate and accelerate growth, and a small FER accumulation has the 
opposite impacts.  
  
The statement c) means that a small FER selling (or debt accumulation), if it is feasible, 
would be rational.. To some extent this result is similar to that received by Rodrik (1987).  
 
Proof. One has  
)( 31
2
sss ddDD +−= , 
where a subscript s  means partial differentiation with respect to s . We consider a response 
of the economy on the introduction of a small tariff or FER accumulation. Thus all 
derivatives are taken at a balance equilibrium without tariffs, at s =1, *pz = . Our nearest 
task is to determine the sign of sQ . 
  It is simple to check that 
][
1
111
1 QdAdQD ss −= −− αα + ][ 1333 QdqAd s −−αα = 
                                                  ][1 QA −ασ σ - ]*)([*)( 131 QpqqApqq −−− −− ασ σσ ,     (51) 
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where )1*,( pQQ = . 
   Using (39) and (47), it is easy to check also that ).1*,( pQ>α  Therefore 
0*)( 1 >−− − Qpqqα  as well. If   
σσσ
13
22 *)( AApqq >− − ,  (52) 
then  
0<sQ .                             (53) 
 Indeed if σσσ 13
1*)( AApqq >− −  then (53) holds.  I view of (52) the same is true if 
σσσ
13
1*)( AApqq ≤− − .  
     If the difference *pq −  is small enough and 2/1<α  ( 2<σ ) then (52) is valid, and  
0<sQ . Obviously, (52) holds if 2/1<α  and 13 AqA > .  
Let us consider now 
1
3311 *)()1*,(
−−−= σσσ σβσβ pqqAAphs .   
Assume that 1β  >> 3β  or *pq −  is small enough. Then 0)1*,( >phs , therefore 
also )1*,( psΨ >0. Remind that ),( szΨ is an increasing function of  the real exchange 
rate, z (see Remark to Proposition 5). Therefore a small tariff causes an up-shift of ),( szΨ  
and decreases an equilibrium real exchange rate. A small RES accumulation causes an up- 
shift of ∆−Ψ ),( sz  and also decreases z  (one has to consider equation 
)0,),( <∆∆+=Ψ ρsz . Now recall that ),( szh is a decreasing function of z  if 3β >> 2β , 
therefore a small tariff or/and a small RES accumulation increases rate of growth. 
 Thus the first two statements of the Proposition 8 is proved. 
 
 The proof of the third statement uses somewhat similar considerations, and we omit them. 
 
Let us summarize the results. We introduce a tariff by such a way to stimulate domestic 
production of capital goods. At the earlier stages of development foreign trade sector 
externality, 3β , is weak, and a domestic consumption sector externality, 2β , prevails. In this 
case tariffs increase real exchange rate, and the tariff policy is compatible with selling of 
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FER (statement c)). As soon as the foreign trade sector externality becomes stronger than 
domestic one a FER accumulation policy turns out to be rational.   
 
 There is an obstacle to consider this interpretation of Proposition 8 as completely adequate. 
Its statements a), b) and c) are related to technologies with different shares of capital, α . For 
developed countries, this share is usually about 0.4.  However, it is larger than one half for 
most Latin American Countries and Singapore  (Barro, Sala-I-Martin (1995), p. 380-381)18. 
One may suppose that the capital share is typically decreasing when an economy is 
developing. If this is the case then the picture described above become more plausible.  
  If one believes in this explanation then the most difficult question arises: which forces and 
mechanisms are driving the evolution of externalities? This is an important problem for 
future research.    
       
Appendix 1 
In this Appendix we formulate the model of Section 4 in nominal ruble terms and show how 
to get the formulation in the text.  
 
PTBrPciAdtdMdtdA +−−+Π+−=+ )(~// 1 ξπν ,                                  (1A) 
where M is nominal money holding,  A is the nominal value of assets, Π~ is  production  
profit, P  is a ruble price of the consumption good, π is inflation rate of ruble, ξπ  is rate of 
ruble devaluation, )//( dtdξξπ ξ = , where ξ  is exchange rate in ruble/dollar term,  B is  
ruble value of assets held by foreigners, T is  money transfer, 1, rν  are, respectively, nominal 
domestic and world market interest rates. We assume that world market prices and interest 
rate are stable.  
Let 1ν  be a rate of return paid to foreign investors in ruble terms.   In view of no arbitrage 
condition, world market interest rate is equal to rate of asset revaluation plus rate of return. 
This means  
)/(/)/1()/( 11 ξνξξ BdtBdBr += , 
                                                          
18 In Barro, Sala-I-Martin (1995), the data on advanced countries are given for 1947-1973, and for 1960-1990. 
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thus ξπν += 11 r . There are empirical evidences that rate of return, 1ν , should not be equal to 
domestic interest rate, ν . For developing economies, one has to expect 1νν > . Probably, this 
difference may be explained, at least partially,  by risk considerations. However, in our 
deterministic framework, we prefer to assume that foreign investor needs in resident 
intermediaries who appropriate the difference Br )( 1 ξπν −− .  This assumption reflects the 
fact that operations at a domestic financial market are more costly for foreigners than for 
residents.  
  We postulate also that foreign investors spend abroad their interest payments )/(1 ξBr . This 
somewhat arbitrary assumption implies a simple expression for foreign investment inflow 
db/dt. One has 
 dtdbdtBdBrBdtBd //)/1()/()/(/)/( 11 =−−+ ξξξνξ . 
Since ξπν += 11 r , we get dtdbdtBd //)/( =ξ , therefore one may take ./ξBb =  
The profit Π  is a sum of three terms 
Π~ = Π~ 1 +Π~ 2 +Π~ 3 ,                          
where Π~ i - is the profit of the Sector i.  
The profit of Producer i  is derived from maximization of the profit     
)),((max~ iiii krKkFB ξ−=Π , (2A) 
where 332211 )(,, APqBPABAB −=== ξξ , q is a fixed price of the exported good, 
ξπν −=r  .  
Denote ξ/ii Bb = , ξ/Aa = , ξ/Pp = , ξ/Mm = .  Then it is simple to check that (1A) and 
(2A) imply budget constraint (2) in the text, and that (10) is consistent with our assumption  
RrdtdRbrdtdbqYI 113 // +−−+= ,                                  (10) 
 where R stays for accumulated reserves.  
      Evidently, 
PTRrdtdRdtdM +−= ξ)/(/ 1 .                  
Since dtmdPdtPdmdtdM /// +=  = ξπ )/( mpdtpdm + , equation (13) in the text is valid:  
pTRrdtdRpmdtpdm +−=+ 1// π .                 (13) 
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Conclusions  
Cross-country regressions were used to estimate the impact on growth of such policies as import 
protection, accumulation of foreign exchange reserves, increases of the size of the government. It 
turned out that the impact of these policies depends on the level of development and on the 
strength of institutions –f or poorer countries with weak institutions and for rich countries with 
strong institutions policies that are conducive to growth are exactly the opposite.  We were able to 
identify three major groups of countries: (1) for relatively poor countries (with GDP per capita 
below 65% of the US level) with rapidly improving institutions (decrease in corruption by over 
26% in the 1980s-90s) all three policies have positive impact; (2) for poor countries with slowly 
improving or deteriorating institutions increases in reserve/GDP and government revenues/GDP 
ratios are beneficial, but increases in import duties yield negative results; (3) for all rich countries 
(with GDP per capita above 65% of the US level; among these countries there is none that 
managed to cut corruption by over 26%) accumulation of reserves and tariff protection are 
detrimental to growth, whereas increases in the fiscal capacity of the government provide very 
little returns. 
 
The art of the policymakers in developing countries is to enact appropriate set of policies 
depending on the level of development and the quality of institutions. Increases in the ratio of 
reserves to GDP were always good for developing countries, irrespective of the quality of 
institutions: the poorer was the country, the stronger was this effect. The increase in government 
revenues to GDP ratio was also good for growth in developing countries: the better were the 
institutions and the lower the GDP per capita, the stronger was this effect. Tariff protectionism was 
good for poor countries, but depended crucially on the quality of institutions – for countries that 
did not manage to decrease corruption by more than 26% over the period of 1980s-90s the impact 
of import duties on growth was negative. Finally, for countries approaching income levels of 
developed states increases in reserve/GDP ratios and tariff protection yielded negative results, 
whereas positive impacts of expansion of state revenues was not sizable and diminishing with the 
increase in the level of development.  
 
If one compares these policy prescriptions with the actual policies pursued by various countries in 
1975-1999, it turns out that low income developing countries suffered from very diverse policy 
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mistakes: under-accumulation of reserves, excess and insufficient protectionism, too slow growth 
of government revenues. Typical policy mistakes for developed countries were excess tariff 
protectionism, over-accumulation of reserves and too slow (in three cases – too fast) increase of 
the fiscal capacity of the state. 
 
There is certainly a simultaneity problem in our regressions and more research is needed to prove 
that the causation runs the way we described. Using the panel data would allow to run Granger 
causation test, but studying growth with panel annual or even with 5-10 years interval data always 
poses a problem of not being able to control for too many specific historical events, like currency 
crises, natural disasters, wars, etc. The longer is the period for comparison, the more reasons to 
believe that the impact of these events on cross-country differences in growth cancels out. More 
promising avenue is to search for instrumental variables in each case, which is not an easy task. 
We believe, however, that the logical argument about causation is the strongest: we considered 
mostly the impact on growth of policy factors, while controlling for objective circumstances that 
are beyond the control of policymakers. A country can accumulate more or less foreign exchange 
reserves, it can impose import duties or liberalize trade, it can cut (if not increase) government 
revenue, but it cannot change rapidly its level of development and its quality of institutions.  
 
There are of course political economy factors for carrying out bad or good policies, but it is of 
interest to find out which particular policies pay off for promoting growth before asking another 
reasonable question: why many countries do not follow good policies. Additional complication is 
that in our interdependent world “good policies” for developing countries, whether its trade 
protectionism or exchange rate protectionism, in most instances cannot be pursued unilaterally, 
without the co-operation of the West or at least without some kind of understanding on the part of 
the rich countries.  
 
The recognition that potential benefits of good policies are contingent on the level of technological 
and institutional development should be supplemented with the understanding that developing 
countries are supposed to have a right to proceed with “different” set of policies in establishing 
tariff protection, accumulating reserves and increasing the ratio of government revenues to GDP. 
The evaluation of reforms in developing countries should be carried out accordingly. There is no 
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need to add three mistakes (sub-optimal rates of tariff protection, increase in government 
revenues/GDP and reserves/GDP ratios) to two misfortunes (low level of technological 
development and poor quality of institutions).  
 
Finally, it is important to recognize, that each of three growth promoting industrial policies 
has its costs – it affects negatively current consumption, even though integral consumption 
can increase. Different countries have most probably different preferences with regards to 
current versus future consumption – developing countries, especially authoritarian regimes 
can prioritize growth at the expense of current consumption, whereas developed countries are 
less likely to sacrifice current consumption for achieving higher future consumption, and even 
less so – for achieving higher future GDP growth rates. This could provide another 
explanation, why rich countries embark less on growth promoting policies than the poor 
countries. 
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Table . Some macroeconomic indicators for rapidly growing countries in 1960-99 
Countries Annual 
average 
GDP 
per 
capita 
growth 
rate, % 
Increase 
in 
FER/GDP 
ratio, p.p., 
1960-99 
Average 
FER/GDP 
ratio, % 
Highest 
FER/G
DP ratio 
in 1960-
99, % 
Average 
FER in 
months 
of 
import, 
1975-99 
Ratio of 
PPP to 
official 
exchang
e rate in 
1975-
99, % 
An. av. 
net in-
flow of 
FDI in 
1980-
99, % of 
GDP 
Aver
age 
expor
t/GD
P 
ratio, 
% 
Increase 
in export/ 
GDP 
ratio, p.p. 
Averag
e 
invest
ment/ 
GDP 
ratio, 
% 
Countries with average annual growth rate of GDP per capita of over 4% 
Botswana 6,13 86,93 
(1976-99) 
68,89 
(1976-99)
121,82 
(1998) 
13,64 53,86 2,20 41,83 3,88 27,61
China 4,94 13,72 
(1977-99) 
8,68 
(1977-99)
16,31 
(1999) 
7,36 38,26 2,26 11,76 20,77 
(1970-99)
31,31
 Hong Kong, 
China 
5,12 27,59 
(1990-99) 
42,74 
(1990-99)
60,56 
(1999) 
3,61 83,03 -1,10 103,37 48,8 27,33
Japan 4,18 2,37 3,42 6,76 
(1999) 
3,54 115,98 -0,62 11,20  -0,34* 32,01
Korea, Rep. 5,82 14,17 5,89 18,21 
(1999) 
2,11 58,23 -0,07 25,08 38,9 27,93
Singapore 5,87 72,76 60,55 90,52 
(1998) 
4,76 93,93 6,80 163,66 41,96 
(1965-96)
34,57
Thailand 4,51 14,44 14,75 27,97 
(1997) 
4,47 41,69 1,61 41,63 26 27,98
Countries with average annual growth rate of GDP per capita of 3 to 4%%         
Hungary 3,11 27,59 
(1990-99) 
14,18 
(1983-99)
22,67 
(1999) 
3,52 36,05 4,27 
(1990-99) 
38,06 22,44 
(1970-99)
28,79
Greece 3,36 9,90 6,83 15,64 
(1994) 
3,86 69,99 1,08 14,42 10,76 27,02
Indonesia 3,43 19,09 
(1967-99) 
6,65 
(1967-99)
23,89 
(1998) 
3,36 42,54 0,93 
(1990-99) 
22,04 19,9 22,34
Ireland 3,89 -11,22 14,61 22,51 
(1977) 
2,46 93,99 2,08 49,20 57,9 18,71
Luxembourg 3,06    -3,61 
(1984-99) 
2,10 
(1984-99)
4,29 
(1985) 
0,03 123,23  103,7
6 
14,4 18,43
Malaysia 3,91 24,55 21,26 42,13 
(1993) 
4,19 59,12 4,36 58,80 71,1 27,83
Mauritius 3,30 6,94 14,53 32,32 
(1991) 
2,74 42,99 0,50 50,29 36,9 22,83
Norway 3,03 6,94 10,57 22,56 
(1985) 
3,91 125,96 -0,51 38,19 2,22 22,83
Portugal 3,83 -9,31 26,77 51,40 
(1979) 
2,86 56,78 0,98 24,98 15,28 
(1960-98)
24,66
Spain 3,31 1,80 8,18 13,06 
(1997) 
5,25 80,05 0,61 15,56 19,2 23,13
* In 1960-84 the ratio increased by 4,09 p.p.       Source: WDI.  
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BOX. The story of two countries: Algeria and Malaysia 
 
Country/indicator Algeria Malaysia 
PPP GDP per capita in 1975, $ 1953 1277 
Population in 1975, mln. 16 12 
PPP GDP per capita in 1999, $ 5063 8209 
Growth rate of GDP per capita, annual average for 1975-99, % 0.3 4.1 
Life expectancy in 1970-75, years 55 63 
Life expectancy in 1995-2000, years 69 72 
Population growth, annual average for 1975-99, % 2.6 2.6 
Investment/GDP ratio, average for 1975-99, % 34 32 
Budget deficit, annual average for 1975-99, % of GDP -1.3 -4.2 
Inflation, annual average for 1975-99, % 14.1 3.7 
Government revenues as a % of GDP in 1995-99 29 25 
Government revenues to GDP ratio in 1995-99 as a % of 1970-75 124.4 No data 
Import taxes as a % of GDP, 1996-99 4.3 2.4 
Increase in FOREX to GDP ratio in 1975-99, p.p.  1 22 
Policy-induced increase in FOREX to GDP ratio in 1975-99, p.p. 3.9 9.2 
External trade to PPP GDP  ratio, average for 1980-99, % 21 69 
Increase in trade/GDP ratio in 1975-99, p.p. -26 9 
Rule of law index in 2001 (ranges from –2.5 to +2.5) -0.97 0.34 
Government effectiveness index in 2001 (ranges from –2.5 to +2.5) -0.81 0.53 
Investment climate index in 2000 (ranges from 0 to 100) 59 76 
 
Initial conditions in two countries are similar, but the quality of institutions and policy 
variables are different : 
 
Algeria relied on import taxes (import substitution), whereas Malaysia underpriced its 
exchange rate via accumulation of reserves (export orientation). Hence the share of foreign 
trade in GDP increased in Malaysia, but decreased in Algeria; 
 
Although budget deficit was higher in Malaysia, inflation was higher in Algeria; 
 
Institutions were much stronger in Malaysia – at least by the end of the period.  
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LIST OF NOTATIONS  USED IN THE TEXT*  
 
Indicator Notation 
      ПОКАЗАТЕЛИ ЭКОНОМИЧЕСКОГО И ИНСТИТУЦИОНАЛЬНОГО РАЗВИТИЯ     
Среднегодовые темпы роста ВВП (по ППС) на душу населения, $  GROWTH 
ВВП по ППС в 1975г., млрд. долл. Y 
ВВП на душу вначале периода, $, ППС, 1975г. Ycap 
Индекс инвестиционного климата в 2000г. (ICRG, от 0 до 100%; чем ближе к 
100, тем лучше климат) 
RISK 
Индекс правопорядка в 1999 г. (от –2.5 до +2.5, чем выше, тем лучше 
правопорядок)  
RofL 
 Индекс контроля над коррупцией в 1980-85гг. (от 0 до 10, чем выше, тем 
меньше коррупция) 
CORR 
Прирост индекса контроля над коррупцией с 1980-85гг. по 2002-03гг.,баллы CORR∆  
Инвестиции в % к ВВП, в среднем за период INV 
Среднегодовые темпы роста населения за период, % POP 
  
                             ПОКАЗАТЕЛИ ЭКОНОМИЧЕСКОЙ ПОЛИТИКИ 
Доля госдоходов в ВВП в 1971-75гг., % G 
Доля госдоходов в ВВП в 1995-99гг. в % к уровню 1971-75гг. G∆  
Средние импортные пошлины в 1975-99гг., в % к стоимости импорта T 
Рост отношения «резервы/ВВП» в 1975-99гг., п.п. R∆  
Вызванный собственно экономической политикой («скорректированный») 
рост отношения «резервы/ВВП» в 1975-99гг., п.п. 
R∆ pol 
 
*Если один и тот же показатель используется для разных лет/периодов, то 
годы/периоды указаны в тексте и в таблицах в каждом отдельном случае. 
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Fig. 1. Increase in the ratio of exports to GDP and average annual growth 
rates of GDP per capita in 1960-99, %
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Fig. 2. Average share of exports and investment in GDP in 1960-99, %
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Fig. 3. Import duties as a % of import in 1975-99 and the increase in export as a 
% of GDP in 1980-99, p.p. 
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Fig.4. Average tariff rate (% of import) and growth rate of per capita GDP (%) 
in 1870-90 and 1890-1913 
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Fig. 5. Government revenues to GDP ratio in 1971-75 and in 1995-99, %, and PPP 
GDP per capita in 1975 as a % of the US level
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Fig. 6. Average real exchange rate versus the US $ (Year 12 = 100%)  in fast 
growing developing economies, year "0" denotes the point of take-off
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Fig. 7. Average ratio of gross international reserves to GDP and average 
annual growth rates of GDP per capita in 1960-99, %,
R2 = 0,2396
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Fig. 8. Simulation: marginal impact on growth of the increase by 10 p.p. of (1) 
government revenues to GDP ratio, (2) reserves to GDP ratio, (3) import duties 
to import ratio for countries w ith different level of development 
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Fig. 9. Marginal impact on growth of GDP per capita in 1975-99 of  10 p. p.  
increase in (1) government revenues/GDP ratio, (2) reserves/GDP ratio, (3) 
average (1975-99) ratio of import duties to import (assuming actual values 
for the other two policies)
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Fig. 10. Simulation: marginal impact on growth of the increase by 10 p.p. of 
(1) government revenues to GDP ratio, (2) reserves to GDP ratio, (3) 
import duties to import ratio depending on GDP per capita and corruption 
levels/change
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Fig.11. Increase in corruption perception index in the 1980s-90s and PPP 
GDP per capita in 1975  in countries w ith different policy potential (G - gov. 
revenues to GDP ratio, R- reserves to GDP ratio, T- import duties to foreign 
trade turnover ratio, %)
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Fig. 12. Marginal impact on growth of the increase by 10 p.p. of  import 
duties to import ratio and actual impact on growth of tariff protection
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Fig. 13. Marginal impact on growth of the increase by 10 p.p. of 
government revenues to GDP ratio and actual impact on growth of the 
increase in government revenues/GDP ratio
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Fig. 14. Marginal impact on growth of the increase by 10 p.p. of reserves to 
GDP ratio in excess of objective needs and actual impact or reserve 
accumulation on growth
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Fig 15.  THE ECONOMY 
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